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NOTE

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2634th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 11 December 1985, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Léandre BASSOLE (Burkina Faso).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2634)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Letter dated 6 December 1985 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17671).

The meeting was called to order at 4.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 6 December 1985 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17671)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In conformity with decisions taken at the 2633rd meeting, I invite the representative of Nicaragua to take a place at the Council table. I invite the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, the Syrian Arab Republic and Viet Nam to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Chamorro Mora (Nicaragua) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Moya-Palencia (Mexico), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic) and Mr. Bui Xuan Nhat (Viet Nam) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Costa Rica, Cuba, Honduras and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the debate, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Berrocal Soto (Costa Rica), Mr. Oramas Oliva (Cuba), Mr. Herrera Cáceres (Honduras) and Mr. Azzarouk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

3. Mr. KRISHNAN (India): My delegation has already had the opportunity of congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December and of expressing our confidence in your well-known ability to give guidance and leadership to the Council. Last week, we arrived at a satisfactory conclusion to our deliberations in regard to the situation in Angola. We hope that our current deliberations on the situation in Central America will lead similarly to a successful outcome.

4. The item relating to the situation in Central America has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for the last three years. This is the tenth time over this period that Nicaragua has felt compelled to have recourse to the Security Council. This is indicative of the gravity of the deteriorating situation that obtains in Central America and the sense of insecurity that the Nicaraguan Government and people continue to experience.

5. In spite of the valiant efforts of the Contadora Group to find a political solution to the problems of Central America, the situation in the region continues to be marked by instability and strife. Acts of interference and intervention—direct and indirect—have continued and even intensified. Statements have been made which fly directly in the face of the concepts of sovereignty and independence of States. The process of dialogue between the two States directly concerned has been interrupted. New forms of pressure and coercion have been brought into play.

6. Yesterday, we had the opportunity of listening with attention and—I must confess—growing concern to the statement of the Acting Minister for External Affairs of Nicaragua, who explained with clarity the developments that have compelled Nicaragua once again to seek redress by the Council. It is clear that the people of Nicaragua have been subjected to great hardship and distress, and the economy of the country has suffered considerable disruption and damage.

7. In my current capacity as representative of the Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, I should

like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our solidarity with the Government and people of Nicaragua, a friendly and fellow non-aligned country. We respect the right of Nicaragua, as indeed of all States, to be masters of their own destiny. We note the will of the Nicaraguan people to mould a new future for their nation, and we support their efforts to build a new society, free from all foreign interference or pressure. We affirm the sovereign right of every country to pursue its own political and social and economic system.

8. Security Council resolution 530 (1983), adopted in May 1983, reaffirmed the right of Nicaragua and of all the other States of the area to live in peace and security, free from outside interference. That resolution also recalled the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the obligations of States to settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means, not to resort to the threat or use of force and to respect the self-determination of peoples and the sovereign independence of States. More recently, Council resolution 562 (1985), adopted in May this year, *inter alia*, affirmed the inalienable right of Nicaragua and the rest of the States to decide on their own political and economic systems free from outside interference, subversion, direct or indirect coercion, or threats of any kind; reaffirmed its firm support to the Contadora Group; called on States to refrain from carrying out political, economic or military actions of any kind against any State in the region which might impede the peace objectives of the Contadora Group; and called on the Governments of the United States and Nicaragua to resume the dialogue in Manzanillo, Mexico. Regrettably, these resolutions continue to remain on paper.

9. The situation in Central America has figured prominently among the important issues engaging the attention of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983, took note with great concern of the continuing tension in Central America. To quote from the Political Declaration adopted at that meeting, the heads of State or Government "denounced the new and increasing threats and acts of intimidation and the growing seriousness and increased number of acts of aggression against Nicaragua", which "were considered part of a deliberate plan to harass and destabilize that country" [*see S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 136*].

10. More recently, at its Conference of Foreign Ministers at Luanda in September, the Movement gave expression to—and here I quote from the Final Political Declaration adopted by the Ministers—"deep concern that the present situation in Central America constitutes one of the main focal points of tension at the international level" [*see S/17610 and Corr.1, annex I, para. 204*]. The Ministers

> "condemned the escalation of aggression, military attacks and other actions against Nicaragua's sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, stability and self-determination. In this regard, they especially condemned the violation of its air space and territorial waters, the launching of international manoeuvres and other intimidating acts; threats of seizure and occupation and selective bombing of Nicaraguan territory; the use of neighbouring countries as bases for aggression and the training of mercenary groups; acts of sabotage; air and naval attacks; the mining of the country's main ports; and the imposition of coercive economic measures, including the trade embargo" [*ibid., para. 205*].

Additionally, the Ministers

> "expressed the opinion that these new acts of political and economic pressure, coupled with military actions, should be considered within the framework of a broader plan to destabilize and overthrow the Government of Nicaragua; and that they augment the risk of a regional war and hinder the necessary dialogue that the Contadora Group is promoting to achieve a negotiated and political solution to the region's problems" [*ibid., para. 207*].

11. When we consider the situation in Central America, our thoughts turn inevitably to the Contadora Group, which for nearly three years now has been engaged in an admirable effort to bring peace to that troubled region, marshalling the genius, and calling upon the political will, of Latin America itself to solve the problems afflicting the area. However, as the Secretary-General noted in his latest report on the subject, "despite the efforts of the Contadora Group, the situation in Central America has been steadily deteriorating this year" [*see S/17549, para. 8*]. He also stated that "It is imperative for the countries with interests in the region to support with deeds the Contadora Group's efforts and refrain from any action that might adversely affect them" [*ibid., para. 11*].

12. My country, along with other non-aligned countries, has been following the developments in Central America with serious concern. The Movement has deplored the use of coercive measures against Nicaragua, as well as the overt and covert attempts to interfere in its internal affairs. It is our conviction that the tensions and disputes in the Central American region can only be resolved peacefully and through negotiations among all concerned. We welcome and support the efforts of the Contadora Group and the recently constituted Lima Support Group. We hope that the Contadora Group, with the support of the entire international community and with the good will and co-operation of all the States concerned, will be able to invigorate its efforts. At this critical juncture, its effective functioning has assumed an even greater dimension and significance. The continuation of its efforts is crucial to the resolution of the problems of the region. It is essential that they be intensified. It is equally important that these address the basic issues at stake. This is indispensable for the eventual success of its efforts.

13. It is our profound conviction that peace in Central America cannot rest on the foundations of policies of intervention, interference and intimidation, on the threat or use of force, or on coercive measures of any kind whatsoever. For any peace to be enduring it must be based on acceptance of the principles of the political and socio-economic pluralism of States, scrupulous observance of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention,

a positive appreciation of the endemic problems of that troubled part of the world and a constructive and co-operative approach to their resolution. It is incumbent upon the Security Council and all its members to grasp this reality and give the urgent task of bringing peace to that region a real chance.

14. Over 30 years ago the first Prime Minister of newly independent India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, stated:

> "Every country has a right to choose its own path and go along with it. We have chosen our path and we propose to go along with it, and to vary it as and when we choose, not at somebody's dictate or pressure; and we are not afraid of any other country imposing its will upon us by military methods or any other methods."

Those words were not uttered in any specific context. They were universal and abiding truths, not limited by time or space, and they represented the very basics both of non-alignment and indeed of the Charter of the United Nations. As we proceed with our debate, let us reflect on those seemingly simple words and see if they have any relevance to the agenda item before us today.

15. Mr. ALZAMORA (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First, I extend brotherly greetings to you, Sir, and tell you how pleased we are to see you presiding over the Council, which so much appreciates your personal and professional qualities. I also wish to express my delegation's appreciation of the outstanding way in which our friend Mr. Woolcott of Australia presided over the Council during the month of November.

16. Because we are Latin Americans we have a duty of solidarity with the brother people of Nicaragua; because we are non-aligned we have a shared responsibility to defend the principles of self-determination and non-intervention; and because we are members of the Support Group linked to the Contadora effort we are committed to the collective task of achieving a peaceful, negotiated, stable and democratic solution to the question of Central America.

17. Our membership in the Council, though, obliges us to reflect even more profoundly in scope and perspective in order to assess objectively the consequences for the international community of the dangerous course of events in Central America.

18. It is not necessary to have more information or imagination to realize that the situation in Central America is entering an extremely serious stage at which the decision has been reached to use all the military, economic and political resources necessary to pursue a pre-established geopolitical purpose to its final consequences.

19. In the face of the use of force, anywhere and in any circumstances, as a legitimized form of diplomatic action, it is pointless to invoke enshrined principles and commitments undertaken at the international level. All that can be done now is to appeal to reason and common sense, and perhaps also to recall the precariousness, demonstrated by recent history, of relying on military superiority as a supreme and permanent argument.

20. We are living today in a particularly serious time in Latin America, when the most profound economic crisis of our history is jeopardizing the political and social fabric of many countries and unleashing with unprecedented intensity forces and energies that will inevitably bring about deep changes in our national structures, the direction of which will certainly mould our future.

21. In this context, the problem of the unjust international trade demonstrated by the debt is an explosive and volatile factor that will be decisive in the inevitable process of future change. It is within that delicate framework of contemporary reality that we must consider the attempt to turn back the clock of history by force and the obsessive attempt to impose on 3 million Latin Americans a destiny different from that which they have chosen, without realizing that this could cause a change very different from the one sought in the direction of the 400 million Latin Americans who see in this new combat between David and Goliath a threat to their dignity, unity and sovereignty and a return to a period of our history that we believed and trusted was a thing of the past.

22. As is always the case, an attempt to stifle by force the people's claims and feeling of national independence is unwittingly awakening the dormant energies of a great volcano. That is a tragedy for a region which today is attempting to work out, in the absence of co-operation and in the face of international indifference, a proper space for its democracy and which has succeeded in finding its own ways of arriving at peaceful, negotiated solutions to the most delicate situations in cases when its autonomy and freedom to do so have been respected.

23. That ability to reach agreement and understanding without the interference of external factors could have, and still may be able to, offset any real risk to the peace and security of the region, affirmed political and social stability, ensured respect for the sovereignty and integrity of all and promoted a political evolution that could reconcile freedom with justice and open the door to genuine participative democracy based on ideological and economic pluralism within the framework of genuine non-alignment. We would thus have given an example of democratic maturity, of harmonious and fraternal coexistence in the hemisphere, with respect for the principle of the sovereign equality of States, in tune with inter-American principles and pacts, which could with moral authority have preached abroad what is practised within the continent and could have projected our intracontinental relations towards a future of effective trust and security – something which so far has been unattainable.

24. Nothing is perfect, much less an attempt to institutionalize, under siege, a revolutionary process which put an end to the long night of a fierce dictatorship, supported and sustained precisely by many political sectors and economic groups that today claim to intervene on behalf of freedom and democracy.

25. Differences may exist as to methods, procedures and orientation; mistakes can be acknowledged and should be corrected. But what is untenable is to try forcefully to bend the will of a people that recently emerged from a genuine

struggle for freedom and autonomy to impose upon it once again from outside the yoke of domination and dependence. And this course of action holds within it an imminent danger for all the peoples of the third world, because the attempt by the super-Powers to make the settlement of regional conflicts in the third world their own exclusive preserve would amount to repudiating the system of multilateral relations, to liquidating forever the right of self-determination and to disregarding all that this Organization stands for. The Central American crisis is therefore universal in scope and significance, because in that crisis, as in other regional crises, principles and values fundamental to all developing peoples are at stake.

26. Given this situation, Contadora emerges as the sole viable alternative to the option of war in Central America and as the political process that can resolve, if its action is not undermined, the contradictions deeply rooted in the Central American region, whose origins are not limited to the difficulty of having systems of different ideologies coexist, but rather derive from a long history of material, institutional and democratic privation.

27. This has been recognized and proclaimed in different resolutions in this Council which, faced with the worsening of the situation in the region and notorious attempts to frustrate the peace-making attempts of Contadora, has reaffirmed its support for this process by encouraging it to intensify its action for the attainment of a stable, peaceful and negotiated solution. That aspiration is strengthened today by the inclusion of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay as members of the Lima Support Group, which was established precisely to avoid a waning of the Contadora effort and to create external conditions conducive to maintaining its vitality and its dynamics.

28. Thus, entire peoples of Latin America are joining in this attempt to achieve a realistic negotiation which can guarantee peace and security to all the peoples of Central America and which, respecting their sovereign right to self-determination, can promote national unity and regional fraternity for all Central Americans. The Contadora action, which is eminently constructive, should not compromise any interest. The presence within it and in the Support Group of countries of the stature of its members is a guarantee that the objectives of security, stability, peace and democracy, with which they have identified themselves and to which they are committed, can be achieved without violence through intelligent and careful negotiations to preserve values and principles fundamental to all those of us who share that continent. This is the responsibility that has been assumed and that they remain committed to fulfil if the course towards understanding and prudence is not blocked. There are no obstacles which cannot be overcome, unless there is a decision to create them. And the interests of all can be reconciled if there is a real will to do so.

29. Given the military escalation we are witnessing, the Contadora countries and those of the Support Group reiterate their desire for concord, agreement, good will and openness to all the parties involved in the problem and their intent to spare the Latin American region the upheaval and violence that would inevitably accompany a solution of force, imposed from the outside, to the question of Central America.

30. In view of the growing escalation of the conflict in Nicaragua and the consequent worsening of the situation in the region, Peru considers that the conditions exist for the Security Council, in the context of its reiterated support for Contadora, to establish measures of investigation and control commensurate with the seriousness of the situation for peace and security.

31. As a member of the Support Group, Peru will none the less act only in complete agreement and co-ordination with the Contadora Group, whose Latin American efforts it completely supports, and in accordance with the will of the countries most affected by the conflict. We trust that the preventive action that the Council should take and which is also an essential prerequisite for the peace-making action of the Contadora Group may be employed in time to ensure the discharge of the responsibility that we all share to preserve the fundamental principles of the United Nations and the international legal order that it enshrines and to maintain peace and security in the region and in the world, which is our specific function and duty.

32. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I wish to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the post of President of the Security Council. We have no doubt that you will successfully discharge your duties, especially as you have acquired considerable experience in this field. I wish to assure you that you can count fully on the co-operation of the Soviet delegation. We also wish to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Woolcott, who performed most successfully as President last month.

33. The Soviet delegation considers Nicaragua's current complaint to the Security Council as a fully warranted and timely step. In his statement yesterday in the Council, the Acting Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua, Mr. Tinoco, set before the Council facts which testify eloquently to the escalation of the provocative actions taken against his country and the expansion of military interference in its affairs from outside.

34. Almost four years have passed since the time when, at the request of Nicaragua, the question of aggressive actions by the United States against that State was first taken up in the Council. In that period, which is short even for the lifetime of the United Nations, the question of the flashpoint of tension in Central America has become firmly established on its agenda. The constant buildup of hostile actions against Nicaragua has led to a state of affairs in which the situation in Central America has become one of the most potentially explosive in the world and now ranks on a par with the conflicts in the Middle East and southern Africa.

35. The flames of that flashpoint of tension continue to cost the lives of thousands of human beings. But that is not all. In effect, it is putting the torch to the fate of many States of the region and of the international situation as a whole. The logic of events shows quite clearly that if developments in that region cannot be returned to their

normal course, the existing military danger there could lead to a repetition of the tragic events with which the Council is very familiar from the example of other regional conflicts.

36. Therefore, one fully understands the perfectly natural concern felt by the overwhelming majority of States of the circumstances surrounding Nicaragua at the present time. This mounting alarm has been well illustrated by the fact that in the general debate in the plenary meeting of the Assembly representatives of almost 140 States Members of the United Nations in one way or another advocated the prompt settlement of the Central American crisis.

37. None the less, one has to note that the situation in that region of the world continues to become more acute, acquiring an ever more dangerous character. That is the conclusion reached by the Secretary-General, who finds in his latest report that "despite the efforts of the Contadora Group, the situation in Central America has been steadily deteriorating this year" [*see S/17549, para. 8*], and he also refers to "the urgent need for an equitable, comprehensive and negotiated solution in the region" [*ibid., para. 11*].

38. The members of the Council are familiar with the basic political prerequisites for such a solution. A number of these have been reflected in Security Council resolution 562 (1985), adopted in May when the Council met to consider the situation resulting from the introduction by the United States of a trade embargo against Nicaragua. That resolution with full clarity confirmed the inalienable right of Nicaragua and other States to decide on their own political and economic systems, free from outside interference, subversion, direct or indirect coercion or threats of any kind. It also called on all States to refrain from carrying out, supporting or promoting political, economic or military actions of any kind against any State in the region which might impede the peace objectives of the Contadora Group. At the same time, the Council called on the Governments of the United States and Nicaragua to resume the bilateral dialogue with a view to reaching accords favourable for normalizing their relations and regional *détente*.

39. The seven months which have elapsed since the Council adopted that resolution have shown, however, that the situation surrounding Nicaragua is far from normal and the basic provisions of the Council's resolution remain unfulfilled. As far as concerns the United States trade embargo against Nicaragua, the Second Committee of the General Assembly was recently obliged to adopt a special resolution on that question, a resolution which condemned that embargo and other measures aimed against Nicaragua and demanded their immediate repeal.

40. It is clear that the main reason for the aggravation of the situation in Central America still remains, that is, the further escalation of the aggressive policy of the United States against Nicaragua, aimed at gross interference in the affairs of that sovereign State. Irrefutable facts demonstrate that there has been an expansion of the arsenal of the means of military and political pressure against the Nicaraguan people, which has embarked upon the course of autonomous development and progressive transformation. Assorted types of pressure are being used against that country in the form of constant military manoeuvres, which were recently extended for another six months, reconnaissance flights and the threatening presence of naval forces off the coasts of Nicaragua. Also, military operations are being carried out by the counter-revolution from the territory of neighbouring States. There is no doubt as to the address of those who continue to co-ordinate and prepare such operations.

41. The very dangerous manifestation of the escalation of tension imposed from outside was the appearance in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries of anti-aircraft missiles of the surface-to-air type, which led to tragic events in the territory of Nicaragua. There can hardly be any doubt as to who placed those weapons in the hands of the mercenaries, particularly as in Washington quite some time ago it was possible to hear arguments about the "expediency" of their introduction into the camp of the contras. The question therefore arises whether those who practically acclaimed the attack on the Nicaraguan helicopter realize the direction in which they are pushing events. The transfer of that type of weapon to terrorist bands could lead to an unpredictable escalation of criminal acts of violence. The targets of the terrorist acts, as was the case with the mining of Nicaraguan ports, could prove to be the means of transport of various States and peaceful civilians, and not only in that region. This is something that those who advocate the strengthening of the struggle against international terrorism would do well to think about, so that their words can be brought into line with their deeds.

42. I believe that if our aim is to list the illegal acts against Nicaragua, such as the mining of ports, "educational supplies" for terrorist groups, participation of American mercenaries in raids on Nicaraguan territory, the trade embargo and much else, this in itself would take up many pages of an indictment. It is to be emphasized that this course is being conducted openly and is a clear challenge to civilized norms of morality and the principles of international law. The International Court of Justice at The Hague demanded the cessation of such actions, and for good reason. At the same time, the United Nations is a witness of the stubborn unilateral refusal to pursue a dialogue between the two parties, notwithstanding the fact that this has been provided for in the Security Council resolution.

43. The slanderous campaign is being stepped up against the political and economic system which the Nicaraguan people have chosen for themselves. Virtual ultimatums are being delivered to force them to change their internal system and foreign policy, and, in fact, to renounce their sovereignty. It is clear to all that here we have a general policy of destabilization for the overthrow of the Government of that country. The threats against Nicaragua become ever more brazen. In this connection it is sufficient to recall the recent statements of a highly placed United States official concerning the need to "remove the tumour" by means of surgical intervention.

44. Naturally, this dangerous course has given rise to resolute and almost general condemnation throughout the world. The Soviet Union, like many other States of greatly differing political persuasions, cannot be indifferent to the aggressive policy being pursued against Nicaragua. We have a feeling of solidarity with that people of that country, which has valiantly defended its inalienable right to independence and its own path of development.

45. It is obvious that the United States not only is failing to fulfil its obligations as a permanent member of the Security Council but indeed is deliberately undermining the Contadora process for a peaceful settlement of the Central American situation. The United States is trying to cover up its policy of hostility towards Nicaragua by generalities concerning its support for the efforts of the Contadora Group. But what is primarily needed is concrete action to that end; what is needed is the manifestation of political responsibility, the renunciation of strong-arm tactics. This would make it possible to reduce tension in the region and around it and help to establish a climate favourable to a political settlement of the crisis in Central America by the Latin American countries themselves.

46. It is precisely that approach to the problem of normalizing the situation in Central America that is advocated by Nicaragua in making constructive proposals to that end, *inter alia*, concerning the establishment in the region of a zone of peace, free of any foreign presence. That policy was clearly demonstrated in the note addressed by the Acting Foreign Minister of Nicaragua to the Secretary of State of the United States on 6 December [*S/17675, annex*]. In particular, the note contained an urgent appeal to the Government of the United States not to impede negotiations within the framework of the Contadora Group and to promote the establishment of minimum security conditions which would make it possible to continue negotiations on the Contadora Act. Unfortunately, however, we have not a positive reaction to that proposal from the United States.

47. As a consistent supporter of having the countries of the region themselves solve the problems of Central America by political means without foreign interference, the Soviet Union takes a very positive view of the efforts of the Contadora Group and the States which support it to eliminate the external factors which are impeding the normalization of the situation in the region and the resumption of negotiations between the United States and Nicaragua. The Soviet Union calls for recognition of the inalienable right of each people to freedom and independence and to the autonomous choice of the path of its own development so that that right will not be violated by anyone and there will be no outside interference. This Soviet position of principle was outlined fully with complete clarity to the President of the United States during the Geneva summit in November.

48. The actions of the United States which have led to the heightening of tension in the Central American region and the statements of certain American leaders concerning the intention to continue to support the anti-Government bands and overthrow the Government of Nicaragua cannot fail to give rise to serious concern in the Soviet Union, because they not only run counter to the task of improving the international atmosphere, which was referred to in the joint Soviet-American statement, but also create a direct threat to international peace and security.

49. As was emphasized by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, at the session of the Supreme Soviet, on 27 November, "We have always been and will continue to be on the side of peoples defending their independence."

50. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the Security Council must play an important role in the protection of the sovereignty of Nicaragua and other countries of the region. It is the task of the Council to bring a restraining influence to bear on the dangerous developments in Central America.

51. Mr. MOHAMMED (Trinidad and Tobago): My delegation would like to extend to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December. I know that under your able and experienced stewardship the work of the Council will be guided with competence and impartiality. I wish also to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Woolcott, the representative of Australia, for the energetic and responsible manner in which he led the Council's work during the month of November.

52. In May of this year my delegation participated in a debate on the situation in Central America at a meeting of the Council [*2579th meeting*] convened at the instance of the Government of Nicaragua. Today the Council is once more considering the question, against a backdrop of an escalation in the conflict in Central America and, more specifically, the introduction and use of sophisticated weaponry. This escalation can lead only to a further deterioration of the social, economic and political conditions in Central America, as well as hinder attempts to negotiate peace and stability in the region.

53. My delegation deplores the use of force or the threat of the use of force in the resolution of disputes, and if historical precedents provide any indication of future perspectives, Trinidad and Tobago is concerned that we are facing the gloomy prospect of not only an arms race in Central America but the competitive use of increasingly sophisticated weapons.

54. Trinidad and Tobago is convinced that peace, stability and security in Central America must be predicated on the principles of self-determination, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the inviolability of national frontiers and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The mechanism for achieving those objectives must be constructive dialogue both at the bilateral level and within a multilateral framework, of which the Contadora peace process is an appropriate forum. We feel that bilateral and multilateral discussions or negotiations are not mutually exclusive and could be pursued simultaneously in a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance.

55. It is our view that the current problems in Nicaragua have effects on and implications for the entire Central American region. A negotiated settlement is particularly important since what is envisaged is a comprehensive settlement embracing diverse internal and external factors which include social, economic, political and security considerations.

56. My delegation continues to believe that the Contadora process created by the diplomatic and political initiatives of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela and more recently assisted by a support group of additional Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay – provides the framework for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the entire Central American problem. We recall that Security Council resolution 530 (1983) and General Assembly resolutions 38/10 and 39/4 fully support the Contadora process. My delegation considers that the deteriorating situation in Central America warrants increased attention and consideration by the Contadora Group with the assistance of the Support Group and the full support of the parties concerned for the Contadora peace process.

57. Trinidad and Tobago is deeply concerned over the recent deterioration of the situation in Central America. My delegation is convinced that existing mechanisms for the negotiating process to bring about international reconciliation are not lacking; what may be lacking is the political will to negotiate in a spirit of good faith and compromise.

58. Mr. LI Luye (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): It is my pleasure, Sir, to see you assuming the presidency of the Security Council, and please allow me to extend to you my warmest congratulations. I am convinced that, being an outstanding diplomat of Burkina Faso, you will certainly be able to guide the proceedings of the Council to a smooth accomplishment of the important tasks of the Council for this month. I wish also to take this opportunity to express our appreciation and gratitude to your predecessor, Mr. Richard Woolcott of Australia, for his excellent performance in discharging the functions of the presidency for November.

59. We have listened with attention to the statements by Mr. Tinoco, Acting Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua, and representatives from other countries. The Chinese delegation wishes to offer its observations on this question.

60. Despite the continued efforts of the Contadora Group, the situation in the Central American region remains tense and turbulent and no relaxation has been achieved so far. This cannot but cause serious concern for the international community.

61. The fundamental way to alleviate and eliminate tensions in Central America is to remove all outside interference. We therefore oppose the intimidation, interference, infiltration and sabotage carried out by any outside force, in whatever form and under whatever pretext, against the Central American countries. We support the unremitting efforts of the Contadora Group and other Latin American countries in seeking a peaceful settlement of the question of Central America in accordance with the principles of self-determination and non-interference.

62. The Chinese Government and people have all along sympathized with and supported the just struggle of the Nicaraguan people to safeguard their national independence and State sovereignty and develop their national economy. We hold that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries in Central America should be respected. The disputes among the countries in the region and those between the United States and Nicaragua should all be settled through negotiations conducted on an equal basis and in accordance with the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations, but not through resort to force or threat of force.

63. The Chinese delegation hopes that all the concerned parties to the conflicts in Central America will respect the aspirations of the people in Central America and adopt practical and effective measures to terminate the prolonged turbulence in the region so as to enable the Contadora Group and the Lima Support Group to become fruitful at an early date in their efforts in search of peace and stability in Central America.

64. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Cuba. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

65. Mr. ORAMAS OLIVA (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption once more of the presidency of the Security Council. Your well-proved diplomatic talents and your firm commitment to the defence of peace and just causes are a guarantee of a successful outcome of the work of this important body. I wish also to thank most cordially the representative of Australia for the very effective way in which he conducted the Council's work last month.

66. Yet again Nicaragua finds itself obliged to request the convening of the Council in order to set before it the exceedingly grave situation prevailing in the Central American region as a consequence of persistent interference in the affairs of the countries of the region by an imperialist Power. The Acting Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua, Victor Hugo Tinoco, has reiterated that the latest decisions of the United States Government authorizing the supply of aircraft, helicopters, launchers and other kinds of war *matériel* to the mercenary forces committing aggression against Nicaragua constitute a dangerous escalation threatening peace and a serious blow to negotiating efforts.

67. To this we must add the fact that there has been a dangerous escalation of conflict in the region with the introduction of new, sophisticated hardware given by the United States to the Somoza criminals, now called contras, as shown by the shooting down of a Nicaraguan helicopter by a surface-to-air missile. Not only has Nicaraguan air space been mined, but also the cycle of violence has thereby been intensified and tensions raised to levels at which the point of no return might well be reached.

68. The supply of surface-to-air missiles by the United States to the Somozist counter-revolutionaries is a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law. But that is not all. That action is a dangerous precedent because these weapons have not been used previously by mercenaries and now there is a danger of their proliferation.

69. Today a Nicaraguan helicopter has been shot down, but tomorrow it could well be an airliner. The statements of Secretary of State Shultz, applauding the use of surface-to-air missiles by the so-called contras and warmly endorsing their recent criminal acts, are not only irresponsible, encouraging as they do the use of such weapons by Somozist mercenaries, but they also reveal the Yankee hypocrisy when speaking out against terrorism. To give sophisticated weapons to the counter-revolutionary agents in their pay, the contras, is to sanction new acts of terrorism, with unforeseeable consequences.

70. The international community cannot ignore the gravity of these events nor the dangers which may stem from irresponsible and criminal actions and statements by the United States Government and its highest officials, such as those to whom I have referred, including the remarks of the Secretary of State.

71. These facts and actions seriously exacerbate the state of tension and the dirty war waged by the United States imperialism on Nicaragua. That aggression has been repudiated repeatedly by the international community, as can be seen from various General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, decisions of the International Court of Justice and the recent decision of the Second Committee at this fortieth session of the Assembly which condemned the economic embargo and the coercive measures taken by the United States against Nicaragua, as well as from the Final Declarations of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held in September last at Luanda, which express the views of the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations.

72. As set out in the Charter, it is the responsibility of the Security Council to assure the maintenance of international peace and security and to put an end to acts which disturb them such as those I have mentioned, which are a danger to peace and security in our Central American region and may have incalculable international consequences. In this case these actions are all the more serious since the country violating the Charter and openly refusing to endorse any norm of international law is a permanent member of the Council. The attitude of the United States Government is not only unacceptable and to be condemned *ipso facto*, but from any point of view it goes against its status as a permanent member of the Security Council.

73. A few days ago in the General Assembly we said that a people such as the Nicaraguan people, which is imbued with self-respect, will be able to defend tooth and nail its freedom and the right to make its own revolution.

74. The contras today, like self-seeking hacks of the past, are—as Sandino would have said of the latter—"a collection of rabble, cowards and traitors, incapable of leading a patriotic and valiant people such as ours, which is worthy of a better fate, a people whose patriotic attitude is setting an example of dignity and moral rectitude to the other peoples of the continent". This people once again is inflicting a severe defeat on its imperialist enemies and the lackeys in the pay of the Yankee Government. Whatever conspiracy may be hatched, it will be smashed by the determined resistance of the undefeated and victorious Sandinist revolution.

75. How can Nicaragua be asked to make more and more concessions if, with each passing day, it is being asked to pay a very high price for the decision to be the master of its own destiny? Nicaragua is the victim of an undeclared dirty war by the United States; that is well known, because the leaders of that country openly state that the Yankee Government's commitment to the contras is unrestricted. In other words, even if agreement is reached on the Contadora Act, they will continue to back these contra assassins. It is also well known because they unabashedly request more millions of dollars to help these wretched criminals who like vile vermin scurry away from Nicaraguan territory whenever the Sandinist army strikes.

76. It is not Nicaragua that should make concessions, but those committing the aggression against that country who should put an end to their criminal and ignominious war for there to be peace for the peoples of Central America. It is essential that aid to the contras cease and that the interests and aspirations of the Nicaraguan peoples be respected, as President Daniel Ortega Saavedra stated recently in the 42nd meeting of the General Assembly's fortieth session.

77. The time has come to take a firm and resolute stand, because the situation in Central America is deteriorating. What is happening now is a grave threat to peace and security. We must not be fooled by lying press campaigns, the sole aim of which is to create the necessary psychological conditions for the United States Congress to approve new aid for the contras. Let us think back on all these precedents, because tomorrow, when there is some country that wants to do something not to the liking of Washington, some cock-and-bull story will be manufactured so that on the basis of this harmful practice which is contrary to international law, monies may then be voted to arm killers who will try to overthrow that Government—as if the invasion of Castillo Armas in Guatemala, or the assassination of Salvador Allende in Chile or the invasion of Grenada were not enough to demonstrate who is practising the policy of State terrorism and to know exactly what that policy means.

78. Recently, the United States Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Abrams, gave some false figures as to Cuban advisers in Nicaragua. We reject the statement on the presence of Cuban troops in Nicaragua. President Ortega Saavedra, in his statement before the Assembly, provided information on Cuban advisers in his country. The United States knows perfectly well that the Cubans in Nicaragua

are advisers; it is quite clear that that smokescreen is designed to justify new assistance for the contra assassins.

79. Let there be no more endless military and naval manoeuvres in the Central American region, no further aid to the contras, no more aggression against Nicaragua; then we shall be marching towards the bright course of peace. But the Sandinist revolution cannot be asked not to defend itself and to agree to commit suicide. We should help the victim, which is Nicaragua, and impose peace on the aggressor, which is the United States. I believe that now more than ever, the Security Council has a major responsibility, and an opportunity to fulfil the mandate it was given by calmly and firmly helping to restore peace and stability in the Central American region. Our peoples come before the Council seeking help to achieve the peace for which they yearn. It is our responsibility to do our utmost to secure that peace, because while we are sitting here debating the matter, hundreds of brave Nicaraguans are being killed by the criminal bands formed and sustained by the United States.

80. At this time we call for the solidarity of Latin America, the non-aligned countries and peace-loving forces with the heroic Nicaraguan people, which is now defending for all time the sovereignty, independence and dignity of all the small peoples, especially in our America, against their principal and historical enemy.

81. I wish to conclude my statement by quoting from Augusto César Sandino, the General of free men, who said, "there will be justice, and the war of the oppressors of the free peoples will be won by the war of the liberators". As a Cuban with profound faith in the destiny of our America, I express to the Council today my unshakeable belief in the glorious victory of Nicaragua.

82. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

83. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): At the outset of my statement, Sir, I should like to express our great pleasure at your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We assure you that we are participating in the deliberations of the Council because of our keen interest in the establishment of peace, security and harmonious coexistence among the peoples and nations of Central America. I take this opportunity also to convey to your predecessor, Mr. Woolcott, the representative of Australia, our appreciation of his achievements during his objective and judicious guidance of the work of the Council last month.

84. The downing of a helicopter of the Nicaraguan Air Force on 2 December 1985 inside Nicaraguan territory by a sophisticated surface-to-air missile indicates a qualitative escalation and development in the weapons used by the mercenary forces, thanks to the support of the United States, which includes training, funding and armaments, in addition to wide media and political coverage. All of these developments are directed against the independence and sovereignty of Nicaragua.

85. While condemning this act of aggression, we classify it and analyse its objectives in the context of the policy of aggression against Nicaragua, which has been escalating continuously over the last four years. This most recent act of aggression—mining Nicaraguan air space, as it were—goes hand in hand with other such forms of aggression and sabotage as earmarking American funds to provide the mercenary forces with all the means necessary to enable them to expand hostilities laterally and vertically. Such acts of aggression also go hand in hand with continuous military manoeuvres designed to increase tension in this sensitive region of the American continent and to achieve well-known pre-arranged objectives for the purpose of undermining the territorial integrity and independence of Nicaragua.

86. Mr. Shultz, the United States Secretary of State, affirmed on 3 December—that is, a day after the act of aggression against the helicopter—that the United States would persist in its unlimited support of the mercenaries even if the countries of Central America signed the Contadora Act. Mr. Shultz described Nicaragua as a "cancer".

87. These acts of aggression combined with provocative statements run counter to the efforts of the Contadora Group and the Latin American Support Group—that is, the Lima Group—and those of the Secretary-General to rescue the region of Central America from the grip of armed conflict which threatens the entire region with a great explosion with incalculable consequences, in addition to being a flagrant violation of the rules of international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter, especially the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. They reveal an integrated and systematic plan for open intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua directed against the Sandinist revolution and proceeding from a foolhardy imperialist theory that rules out the coexistence of non-aligned progressive government and other systems of government in the region.

88. Everything indicates that the United States does not allow changes that run counter to its own selfish interests, which are always based on the consolidation of relations of inequality with the countries of Central America.

89. We call upon the Security Council to take all the necessary measures to put an end to the aggression against Nicaragua and to strengthen the role of the countries of the Contadora Group and those of the Latin American Support Group. We are convinced that despite the imbalance of power as between the United States, a giant, and Nicaragua, a small developing country, the peoples of Central America and the countries of Latin America in general will never submit to the attempt to turn back the clock by the revival of abominable Somozism in Nicaragua.

90. Today Nicaragua faces a threat to its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Security Council should take all possible measures to promote a peaceful settlement of the dispute and persuade the United States to resume the dialogue with Nicaragua, to cease its acts of aggression against that country—which, although small in size, is great in its values—and to support the Contadora

efforts instead of undermining them. The future of peace and security in Central America depends on the renunciation by the United States of its policy of using force against Nicaragua, directly or indirectly. Instead it should devote its efforts to seeking objectives based on peaceful coexistence and pluralism in the region.

91. The aggressive measures against Nicaragua, if they continue to escalate as they are doing at present, will not only threaten the peace and security of Central America but have grave adverse effects throughout the Caribbean and Latin America, as well as on international peace and security. We call upon the United States to show reason, prudence and understanding in order to contribute to the resolution by peaceful means of the problems and crises in Central America, instead of intervening in the internal affairs of States and resorting to terrorism, aggression and oppression—especially since such crises and problems are the legacy of the régimes of darkness and backwardness imposed by world imperialism and its political and economic interests on that part of the world.

92. Nicaragua has proved by deeds and by words its attachment to the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. Regrettably, however, Nicaragua's attachment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the principles of international law is met by defiance, rejection and disregard on the part of the United States Administration. For that reason, all of us cannot but believe that Washington is seeking openly to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua and, at the same time, is persisting in its attempts to control the destiny of all the peoples of Central America. Such activities cannot be accepted by the international community.

93. In any event, we believe that no giant, however great he may be, can control the destiny of peoples. We call upon the Security Council, in dealing with the question before it, to be guided by the decisions taken by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in 1983, as well as the decisions taken by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries held at Luanda last September. Through those decisions, the majority of the peoples and nations of the world expressed their solidarity with Nicaragua and called for an immediate end to all United States threats and acts of aggression, the operations of mercenaries, and the United States economic boycott against the people and Government of Nicaragua. We are certain that there can be no peace or security so long as there is a direct or indirect United States military presence in Central America.

94. All the peoples of the world are at the side of the militant people of Nicaragua. They wish that people success in its revolution. They wish success also for the peaceful efforts to extinguish the flames of total war that world imperialism is seeking to fan in the region for the purpose of tightening its grip there. History teaches us that peoples that believe in the justice of their cause always are victorious.

95. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Mexico. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

96. Mr. MOYA-PALENCIA (Mexico) (*interpretation from French*): I wish to tell you, Mr. President, how very pleased my delegation is to see you presiding over the delicate work of the Security Council during this month of December. Your experience, your skill and your personal qualifications will be of particular benefit to the Council during its deliberations in these rather difficult times.

[*The speaker continued in English.*]

97. I wish also to express my country's deep recognition of the outstanding performance of the representative of Australia during his presidency of the Council last month.

[*The speaker continued in Spanish.*]

98. I wish to thank the Security Council for giving me this opportunity to express the Mexican Government's views on the Central American situation, on the basis of the complaint that has been lodged by the Government of Nicaragua.

99. We are faced with a dangerous worsening of the crisis in Central America caused by what appears to be a buildup in the arms race in the region. Once again, the choice of solutions of force is being promoted to the detriment of the quest for formulas that can guarantee understanding through diplomatic negotiations.

100. On many occasions we have indicated the consequences that a widespread confrontation would have for the region. But we cannot deny that violence is today a daily fact of life in the areas of greatest conflict. The international community cannot be indifferent to the armed confrontations that occur daily and to the repeated violations and breaches of the international legal order.

101. My delegation does not intend to refer to recent events in isolation. Rather, we wish to draw the Council's attention to those aspects which, in the Mexican Government's view, are at the heart of the Central American conflict.

102. We must repeat once again that in the Central American region the very exercise of the principle of non-intervention is in jeopardy, as is, therefore, respect for the self-determination of peoples. The Government of Mexico has invariably and unequivocally spoken out against any violation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, wherever it may occur. Defence of the principle of non-intervention—a basic norm of international law—has, none the less, special significance for Latin America. It cannot be forgotten that the history of our continent is characterized also, to a very great extent, by foreign intervention and the policy of force. This explains the long struggle of Mexico and the Latin American peoples to establish the principles of non-intervention and self-determination as fundamental norms of inter-American coexistence.

103. Nevertheless, unilateral and totally unacceptable interpretations of Latin America's political development – interpretations that are certainly unrelated to the interests of the countries of the region themselves – have frequently denied the right of peoples to self-determination, which has meant disregard for the legitimacy of national development plans and for the freedom of each country to build its future without any pre-conditions.

104. The Central American crisis, and in particular the situation of Nicaragua, has elements in common with other national processes of past decades. In the past—and this is true today as well—in Latin America what was at stake was the right of peoples to choose their own destiny without any interference and to coexist within a regional order respectful of the democratic plurality of nations and respectful of international law.

105. That is the historical crux of the Latin American problem. It is at the root of the tragedy which threatens Central America.

106. A few weeks ago we had the opportunity to consider the situation in Central America. We pointed out at that time that the action of irregular forces whose purpose is to overthrow legitimately established Governments constitutes, *inter alia*, a clear obstacle to regional détente. Therefore, the peace-making process of the Contadora Group, by pointing very clearly to actions of political or military destabilization as one of the main sources of regional tension, has established in its peace proposals a set of perfectly well-defined commitments to the prohibition of any type of support for such actions.

107. Hence in the final draft of the Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America [*S/17549, annex V*], of September 1985, obligations are laid down that would be assumed by States to prohibit any type of political, military, financial or other support to irregular forces that promote the overthrow or destabilization of other Governments, as well as to prevent by all means within their power the use of their territory for the purpose of committing wrongful acts against the territory of other States. Bringing peace to Central America requires strict respect for that international obligation by States, including those from outside the region.

108. At the same time, we cannot disregard the fact that quantitative and qualitative changes are rapidly occurring in weapons stockpiles in the region. Hence the risks of military confrontation increase and the spiralling arms buildup in Central America is encouraged. Moreover, that runs counter to some of the main declared objectives of the negotiations, which consist precisely of obtaining agreements among the Central American Governments not to introduce new weapon systems in Central America.

109. In our view, supporting Contadora by more than words means immediate respect for the spirit and letter of the principles that guide the search for negotiation aimed at prohibiting acts of political and military destabilization, as well as those principles that refer to controlling and reducing the arms buildup, eliminating the foreign military presence, or eradicating the arms traffic.

110. Every State in the region has a right to security, and it is clear that any transgression of the norms of international coexistence makes it impossible for mutual concessions to be made to strengthen genuine regional security. Without respect for the aforementioned principles the very possibility of political negotiation in the area is seriously endangered.

111. Peace brooks no pre-conditions. Confrontation and blockade must give way to negotiation which can no longer be evaded. Central America requires a real commitment which, in addition to putting an end to the intolerable waste that drains human and material resources in its societies, makes it possible to establish harmonious bases for coexistence. Thus the importance of dialogue among those who have bilateral differences that affect the region at large. Therein also resides the importance of a multilateral agreement, respectful of the individuality of each nation, which can take due account of the legitimate concerns of all parties.

112. This is the challenge confronting Central America. It is the aspiration of Mexico and Latin America – and this has been the clear and reiterated wish of the vast majority of our countries – to begin a new era of inter-American relations respectful of our destiny and plurality. That is why the Government of Mexico speaks out once again for the establishment of dialogue and the adoption of constructive agreements.

113. In his statement before the fourteenth extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, Mexico's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bernardo Sepúlveda Amor said, among other things, the following:

> "All the nations of the continent have a grave responsibility in the crisis of Central America. The conflict in the region threatens the peace, development and political and social stability of the hemisphere. The spread of militarism is a factor which jeopardizes the future of inter-American relations and gravely affects regional security.
>
> "The Governments cannot remain indifferent in the shadow of a tragedy of death and destruction, militarization of societies and exportation of war machinery. We cannot sanction as legitimate what is illegal; we cannot justify actions of destabilization or subversion on the excuse that they protect one's security. That is why we speak of political and moral responsibility.
>
> "It is time for reason to prevail, and for that purpose we understand the need to reconcile legitimate interests and to ensure respect for international law for the benefit of all. The countries in conflict and those which have influence in the area must give up something in order to achieve what is essential."

We have the right to aspire to that, for the cause of Central America is the cause of Latin America. In the regional crisis our own destiny is also at stake.

114. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Viet Nam. I

invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

115. Mr. BUI XUAN NHAT (Viet Nam): Allow me first of all to say how pleased I am during my first appearance in the Security Council at seeing you, Sir, presiding over its work. I am convinced that your ability and diplomatic skill are certainly a guarantee for the successful outcome of our debate. I should like also to extend my congratulations to Mr. Woolcott of Australia for his conduct of the Council's work during the month of November, and our thanks to all the members for giving me an opportunity to take part in this discussion.

116. The war of aggression imposed by the United States on the Nicaraguan people has further escalated to a dangerous extent. The United States Government has decided to authorize the supply of aircraft, helicopters, speedboats and other types of war materials to the mercenary forces operating inside and outside Nicaragua. Recently, for the first time in the history of this continent, it supplied the contras with SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles, which resulted in the death of 14 Nicaraguan soldiers fighting to defend the independence and sovereignty of their country. That is completely contrary to the peace rhetoric of the President of the United States in the General Assembly on the occasion of the meetings commemorating the Organization's fortieth anniversary.

117. What has Nicaragua done to deserve such treatment? Everybody knows that non-aligned Nicaragua is a small and poor country. It is therefore altogether illogical to think, even for a single minute, that it may constitute a threat to the security of the United States, the super-Power of this hemisphere. The illegal and immoral war being waged by the United States against Nicaragua has taken a toll of nearly 10,000 Nicaraguans dead or wounded, 7,600 war orphans, and 240,000 homeless. How much more loss and suffering will the people of that country have to endure?

118. Two weeks ago Viet Nam joined other delegations in the plenary meetings of this fortieth session of the General Assembly to express deep concern at the deteriorating situation in Central America and to condemn the escalation of aggression by the United States and its hirelings against Nicaragua's sovereignty and independence, its acts of sabotage, its air and naval attacks, its mining of the country's main ports and its imposition of coercive economic measures, including the trade embargo.

119. In this very year of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, when the words "peace", "independence", "sovereignty" and "self-determination" are lauded and extolled in the various forums of the Organization, such acts by the super-Power of North America are a challenge and an affront to all nations, big or small; they constitute an open violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and of international law, and in particular they show contempt for the 10 May 1985 Order of the International Court of Justice.

120. While sustained efforts are being made to find a comprehensive political solution to bring peace and stability to the Central American region, the aforementioned acts on the part of the United States have not only aggravated the tension but have also undermined the Contadora process, running counter to the common aspirations of the peoples in the region and in the world.

121. Viet Nam is firmly convinced of the righteousness of Nicaragua's cause. My delegation demands that the United States put an immediate end to all kinds of assistance, overt or covert, to the mercenary forces which are operating either in Nicaragua or from the neighbouring countries and stop all acts of infringement of the sovereignty of Nicaragua, so that favourable conditions will be created for negotiations directed to a comprehensive settlement of the regional issues, thereby translating the peoples' wishes into reality.

122. My delegation reiterates its whole-hearted and unswerving support for the right of the Nicaraguan people to self-defence and for their heroic struggle to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity and their sacred right to life and self-determination. The principles of the Charter must be strictly respected. It is the earnest hope of our delegation that this august body of the United Nations will react properly to the request by the representative of Nicaragua.

123. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I invite the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

124. Mr. RAJAIE KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I extend my sincere congratulations to you, Mr. President. It is a great pleasure to see you presiding over the Security Council. The Council must be proud of its new President, because under your presidency all the oppressed nations have full confidence that the Council will not be and cannot be exploited in the interest of the arrogant Powers. The Council may not be able to take a positive step, for well-known reasons, but it will definitely not be misused, and for this we feel indebted to you for your skill and your personal qualities. Incidentally, your predecessor, Mr. Woolcott of Australia, too, had the vote of confidence of the entire international body. He, too, administered the affairs of the Council most sincerely and very constructively indeed. I extend my special appreciation to him for his good performance in the Council in the month of November.

125. The year 1985 is coming to its final days. I wish also to avail myself of this opportunity to wish you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council a happy New Year.

126. This is the sixth meeting that the Security Council has convened to discuss the problem of Nicaragua in the year 1985, and at the past five meetings nothing significant has been achieved to relieve Nicaragua of its problems caused by the United States Administration. More important is the sad fact of the new escalations which have been reported. The situation around the borders of Nicaragua is deteriorating. The $27 million that has been given to the contras under the label of humanitarian assistance have been converted into SAM missiles, which downed

one of the helicopters that Nicaragua had obtained with great difficulty and for purely defensive purposes. American newspapers have also reported the presence of trucks and lorries which are used by the contras for military transportation. These and other items, of which we do not know very much, have been acquired through the same humanitarian generosity that the United States Administration has extended to the Somoza elements and other mercenaries.

127. It is sad that such generosity by the United States in almost all cases, and certainly in the case of Nicaragua and South Africa, reaches the wrong side. The United States Government could have contributed the same $27 million to the people of Nicaragua. We know that the entire nation of Nicaragua must suffer from economic blockade, the mining of harbours and other political, economic and military activities of the United States, and only the enemies of the nation of Nicaragua benefit from them. This American comprehensive war against Nicaragua deserves the strong condemnation of the international body. As the result of these inhumane policies not only has the entire nation of Nicaragua been taken captive but also the peace and security of the region is in jeopardy.

128. The Contadora Group, which was—and I hope still is—the hope of the entire region, seems to be losing its charisma, and I am afraid that if its members do not take timely and determined action they may be gradually rendered ineffective. The danger in this context is that the United States Administration may be tempted to manipulate or to "influence" the Contadora Group and the Support Group in order to preserve its allegedly justified interests. To the extent that the United States Administration advances in that direction, doubts and sceptical feelings are aroused on the Nicaraguan side, and consequently the credibility and effectiveness of the Contadora Group is damaged.

129. Thus, when the United States Administration might just be feeling happy with its political achievements in terms of having smoothly made the Contadora Group tilt towards a "balance" in favour of the United States, it might, from the viewpoint of the Nicaraguans, have been influencing the Contadora Group and thus diverting it from the balanced position which was the only anchorage for Nicaragua's confidence and trust. In other words, the more the United States persuades the Contadora Group to adopt its own terms of impartiality and evenhandedness, the more the Contadora Group becomes irrelevant to the solution of the conflict. Nicaragua cannot be blamed for this undesirable possible development because it is a small country, not comparable to the United States; only the United States can be blamed.

130. The United States is a country of "star wars" ambitions; it claims to be the richest, the strongest, the most technologically advanced, scientifically matchless, militarily invincible. To conquer the heavens and install an interplanetary service station for the United States may be no longer a mere dream but rather a fairly practical project, if an expensive one.

131. My best and most sincere advice, therefore, to the United States Administration is strictly to avoid any action that might in the slightest degree shake Nicaragua's confidence in the Contadora Group. If they are honestly interested in a solution to the present conflict, the Americans must ensure that the Nicaraguan people can maintain their full trust and confidence in the Contadora Group and the Support Group and be able to continue to believe that the Contadora Group will bridle United States imperialism in Central America. Please do not anybody tamper with the regionally and globally recognized prestige and charisma of the Contadora Group.

132. Considering that there is no comparison between the size, power, population, technology, science, standard of education, health services, educational and research institutions, natural resources, automation devices and services, games, pleasures, sports—sins even, and whatever else representatives choose—of the United States and those of Nicaragua, it is hard to explain this unequal and therefore unjust comprehensive battle. The only explanation is that a country, or rather an empire, of the magnitude of the United States has fallen victim to an unwise, uncultured, bellicose Administration that has no solution to its political problems other than resort to force and that is prepared to be a party to any and every conflict. The fact is that the United States Administration is actually ready to denigrate and waste all the grandeur and glamour of this exceptionally hard-working and productive nation of the United States just in order to destroy such a small, oppressed, Somoza-stricken, good-hearted and really harmless and friendly neighbour as Nicaragua.

133. We deeply regret that it may take many years for the United States Administration to understand that its victory over Nicaragua is a real defeat for the United States. If there were any wisdom or understanding at all among those in the higher levels of that Administration, they would perceive that it is most imperative for them to give up this silly ambition of bringing the Sandinist revolution to its knees. This rancorous obsession is only self-defeating and self-humiliating because it only shows how far from right is the present American concept of the situation in Central America. If this Administration had any respect for the interests of the hard-working and good-hearted American people, it would immediately end this unequal, immoral battle.

134. In the light of the fact that there is no comparison between the resources of the two adversaries and of the seriousness of the threats to peace and security in the region, it would be appropriate to expect Nicaragua to be insecure, angry, defensive, recalcitrant, uncompromising, difficult, and impossible to talk to. But the contrary has always been the case. It is Nicaragua that demonstrates serenity, wisdom, patience, tolerance, security, lack of irritability, openness and readiness for peaceful and constructive talks at any time, in any place and at any level proposed. And we observe that it is the United States that, on the contrary, is very stubborn, difficult and uncompromising and rejects all proposals for negotiations made by Nicaragua.

135. This exchange of positions is due to the fact that, first of all, the United States is not interested in resolving its differences with Nicaragua, and, secondly, it knows that

if it enters into peaceful negotiations, its arguments will not sell in any market for any price. For the same reason it refrained from accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The United States Administration therefore thinks that the best solution from the point of view of its illegitimate concern is a military one. This explains how and why some humanitarian donations can be converted to surface-to-air missiles.

136. In groping for a solution in the dark, a lesson from Viet Nam might help. In the Viet Nam war the United States lost billions of dollars and thousands and thousands of American servicemen—volunteers, soldiers and officers. Yet it sustained a defeat which marked an epoch in American history. Do you not think, Mr. President, that if the United States had offered just one fifth of the material loss alone to the North Vietnamese at that time in the form of a donation, without any expectation of return and without any positive or negative intervention in their internal affairs and problems, the ultimate results would probably have been better than those it finally obtained in Viet Nam? The difficulty is that the learned ignoramuses and the unperceptive sophisticated intellectuals who constitute the policy-making machinery of the United States are so obsessed with repeated defeats that they simply cannot listen; instead they stubbornly continue to solve all their problems by pointing their guns at everybody. They are too preoccupied with their gunboat diplomacy to look back and see what they have done. They just do not understand that what they feel they have to do to Nicaragua is simply not a solution but the undesirable inevitable corollary of the wrong policies which they have adopted towards Central America and Latin America. Wisdom dictates that they should stop doing all those "good" things that they feel like doing in order to meet the challenge of Nicaragua. Instead, they should pay more attention to all the good things that Nicaragua has done in order to show its good will.

137. First of all, the President of Nicaragua has always addressed the United States President with respect and honour; secondly, Nicaragua has always extended its hands in friendship, has always reiterated its readiness for friendly, peaceful talks to resolve differences. It has been careful not to condemn or to use any language that might further antagonize the United States. The Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, the Reverend Father D'Escoto Brockmann, has visited Washington as often as he thought useful to persuade the United States towards friendship.

138. Nicaragua has held a popular election. Such an election was absolutely unnecessary so far as the people of Nicaragua were concerned, because they were fully behind the Sandinist régime, but the elections were still held, to accommodate some of the concerns of the United States. The election might not have been as valid as the so meticulously clean elections of the United States, in which the Watergate scandal was only a peanut, but by our third world standards it was really acceptable. Yet the United States did not stop nagging. Nicaragua is drafting a new constitution in which the right to private ownership—I am told—is also specified.

139. We think the people of Nicaragua must have the right to choose for themselves, without any interference or intervention on the part of the American Administration. Why do some people think that those who overthrew the Somoza régime without United States help cannot establish a system of their own choice without the assistance of some of the American-backed Somoza mercenaries who live on the charity of United States humanitarian donations? What the whole world expects of the United States Administration is only a minimum of understanding and wisdom. Alas, even that minimum just cannot be afforded.

140. May I request you, Mr. President, in the course of your private consultations, to advise the concerned party that his Government is simply wrong, that what it is doing is counter-productive and is threatening the peace and security of Central America, which is not as far away as Viet Nam was. The United States must know that the inevitable American defeat in this region would be slightly different from the one in far away Viet Nam.

141. If the United States Administration is really worried about the so-called spread of communism, it must refrain from making propaganda for it by calling all the heroes and freedom fighters of the region Communists.

142. What the United States is doing in Central America is totally contrary to its purpose. My advice to the American Administration is as follows: please do not do just anything; if you feel you do not want to be absolutely irrelevant and neglected, suffice it to offer considerable assistance only to the same revolutionary Government of Nicaragua; give the Nicaraguans the chance to develop confidence in you and you will see how peacefully and easily they will resolve all your differences with them. They need your friendship, not enmity, your assistance, not conspiracies, and your dignified consideration, not blind intolerance.

143. We believe that Nicaragua is suffering from the lack of proportion that exists between the degree of wisdom and thoughtfulness of the United States Administration and the military force which it can exercise. May the good members of the Council, as well as the Contadora Group, mobilize their collective wisdom in order to make up for that lack of proportion by persuading the United States simply to stop all its programmes and activities against Nicaragua. That would be the best service they could offer to the people of this host country.

144. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In view of the lateness of the hour, I propose to adjourn the meeting now. With the consent of the members of the Council, the next meeting to continue consideration of this item will take place tomorrow, Thursday, 12 December, at 3.30 p.m. I would remind the Council that tomorrow at 11 a.m. there will be a meeting of the Council on the situation in Cyprus, preceded by consultations.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-61439—October 1991—2,050

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

OFFICIAL RECORDS

FORTIETH YEAR

2635th MEETING: 12 DECEMBER 1985

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2635th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 12 December 1985, at 11.25 a.m.

President: Mr. Léandre BASSOLE (Burkina Faso).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2635)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyrpus (S/17657 and Add.1 and 2).

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/17657 and Add.1 and 2)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Austria, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the debate, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Türkmen (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Fischer (Austria) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to recall that in the course of the Council's consultations members agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Özer Koray in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Koray in accordance with rule 39. At the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Koray to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

3. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 June to 30 November 1985 in documents S/17657 and Add.1 and 2, dated 30 November, 9 December and 11 December 1985, respectively. Members also have before them a draft resolution contained in document S/17680, which has been prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

4. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution. Unless I hear any objection I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 578 (1985)].

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is the representative of Austria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

6. Mr. FISCHER (Austria): First, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for December. I am confident that you will guide the Council's proceedings in a constructive manner. I should also like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Woolcott, the representative of Australia, Austria's neighbour in the United Nations, for the exemplary way in which he conducted the Council's work last month.

7. Our request to be allowed to participate in the debate after the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on behalf of all the troop-contributing countries—Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom—was the result of careful deliberations.

8. The purpose of this statement is to address the question of the financial situation of UNFICYP, which is a source of deep concern to the Governments of the troop-contributing countries. The widening gap between the level of voluntary contributions and the real costs of this important peace-keeping operation places an ever heavier burden on our countries. The troop-contributing countries have always borne a large portion of the expenses of

UNFICYP. They have done so because they consider their participation in UNFICYP as a special service to the international community.

9. With the mounting deficit of UNFICYP, however, resulting in totally unsatisfactory rates of reimbursement, the share of the costs borne by troop-contributing countries has become disproportionate and, we believe, unfair. In this situation our Governments have directed a special appeal to Member States to make every effort to alleviate the serious financial situation confronting UNFICYP. We have requested them to increase their contributions or to begin making contributions if they have not done so before. The same request has been made by the Secretary-General, and we are grateful for his continuous efforts.

10. Peace-keeping operations are in the interests of the entire international community. Every Member State has a stake in the continued effectiveness of this essential instrument to safeguard international peace. We cannot ignore the fact that a sound financial basis is an important element for the viability of peace-keeping operations. On the occasion of the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP the troop-contributing countries reiterate their appeal to all Member States to demonstrate their solidarity and to increase their efforts to improve the financial situation of UNFICYP. We also wish to express our appreciation to those Governments that over the years continue to contribute regularly to UNFICYP.

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Cyprus, upon whom I now call.

12. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the high office of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December and to express appreciation for the skilful manner in which you have conducted the consultations on the draft resolution that has just been unanimously adopted, renewing the mandate of UNFICYP for another period of six months. It is a source of great satisfaction to my Government that the presidency of this important organ of the United Nations is in the talented hands of a worthy and distinguished representative of Burkina Faso, a very friendly country with which we share the closest of diplomatic relations, especially within the United Nations and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. May I add my personal felicitations and say that, knowing your diplomatic experience and your friendly and human touch, I conclude that your presidency augurs well for the Council and its important tasks. I also extend my warmest congratulations to your predecessor for the month of November, an outstanding diplomat, Mr. Richard Woolcott of Australia, whose wise and impeccable leadership has already been acknowledged by the Security Council.

13. I thank the members of this body for giving me the opportunity to address the Council. The renewal of the peace-keeping mandate of UNFICYP, to which my Government had given its consent, is, in the circumstances, imperative, owing to the continuing military occupation of part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey's non-compliance with a host of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, as well as the ongoing peace-making initiative of the Secretary-General, to the success of which we attach great importance.

14. The members of the Council are aware that, as a result of the 1974 invasion, almost 37 per cent of our territory remains under Turkish occupation, 200,000 Cypriots have been uprooted from their homes and lands and rendered refugees in their own country and hundreds are missing; and the loss in property is staggering. Our people, who lived intermingled for centuries, have been segregated by blood and iron on the basis of ethnic background.

15. Artificial barriers, *apartheid* policies and attempted secession depict the present grim state of affairs in the occupied areas. A scheme is promoted by Turkey in order to destroy the cultural character and heritage of Cyprus by desecrating and looting churches, some a thousand years old, as well as other places of worship; by looting ancient monuments and treasures; and by changing historical names of towns, villages and places in the ruthless pursuit of total Turkification of the occupied areas. This policy is coupled with the crime of mass importation of settlers to usurp the homes and properties of the expelled Greek Cypriots, with the objective of changing the age-old demographic character of Cyprus. Illegal and sham "elections", the adoption of a so-called new constitution, actions which are contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and in flagrant violation of United Nations resolutions and the very initiative of the Secretary-General—those are some of the illegalities being pursued, even more arduously since the premeditated undermining of the high-level meeting of 17 January 1985.

16. Encouraged by the seeming inability of the world Organization to force Turkey to comply with solemn Security Council resolutions and decisions, Ankara is seeking to complete its unlawful intentions against Cyprus by striking at its territorial integrity and by creating a puppet régime maintained in power by the bayonets of the occupying army.

17. Disregarding the demands in the relevant United Nations resolutions and declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement for complete demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey has recently stepped up its militarization of the occupied areas by completing a major air base in the occupied area of Lefconico, and it is now nearing completion of a naval base in occupied Kyrenia. That is yet another attestation of contempt for the United Nations and an indication of a ruthless determination to perpetuate Turkey's military presence in the island. The size of the installations and the magnitude of the costs should give rise to serious concern as to their true purposes and uses.

18. In stark contrast to Ankara's continuous militarization is my Government's written acceptance of military deconfrontation of the area of Nicosia as proposed by the Force Commander in paragraph 17 of the Secretary-General's latest report.

19. The United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus reflect the consensus of world opinion. These are mandatory decisions. They demand the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus and the return of all refugees to their homes and lands in safety. They further demand respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus and non-interference and intervention in its affairs; they call for respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots, including, of course, freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and ownership of land. They further call for the withdrawal of the declaration of secession, the condemnation of all secessionist acts and the non-recognition of the illegal entity. I need not remind the Council that Turkey cast an affirmative vote for General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was subsequently endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974) and rendered mandatory.

20. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the record of Turkey towards the United Nations and the implementation of these resolutions have been dismal. Up to now, not a single refugee has been allowed to return to his home. As a matter of fact, the contrary is true. Considering that over 20,000 Greek Cypriots had remained in the occupied areas right after the 1974 Turkish onslaught, these unfortunate victims of the cruelty of Attila were forced gradually to abandon their ancestral homes and seek refuge in the government-controlled areas.

21. But what about the Security Council demands for withdrawal of the attempted secession and an end to the Turkish occupation, as well as the need for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms? Total disregard and absolute non-compliance by Ankara. As a matter of fact, each day that passes, new steps are taken by Turkey to consolidate its stranglehold over its small victim by way of new illegalities in the areas controlled by the Turkish army, contrary to United Nations resolutions and Ankara's own assurances given to the Secretary-General.

22. I am sure that the members of the Council do not view as serious the fallacious arguments of Turkey that these illegal acts emanate from the Turkish Cypriots, who allegedly administer the occupied areas. It is the Turkish army that runs everything. It was so recognized by the European Commission of Human Rights, which found Turkey guilty of mass violations of human rights in Cyprus. Whenever and wherever it chooses, the army intervenes in controlling—suppressing, rather—the Turkish Cypriots from whom it demands absolute obedience. There is one soldier for every four civilians, and if we add the settlers brought by Ankara from Anatolia there are two Turkish mainlanders for every four Turkish Cypriots. This militarization and saturation of the area with mainland Turks frustrates any independent policy or action by the Turkish Cypriot community, which in fact is under occupation and thus unable to negotiate freely, as required by United Nations resolutions. The presence of the Turkish troops poses an insurmountable obstacle to genuine negotiations, for nobody can negotiate freely under the barrel of the gun.

23. The expansionist policies of Turkey against Cyprus and its people explain the positions taken by the Turkish Cypriot community through the various rounds of the intercommunal talks on the initiatives of the Secretary-General and in accordance with the provisions of United Nations resolutions demanding the withdrawal of the foreign troops from Cyprus. Indeed, contrary to repeated assurances by Turkey, some of them in this forum, we now face a situation whereby Turkey and Mr. Denktaş dare openly admit that their position has been and will continue to be that the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces is non-negotiable and that the Turkish troops will remain in Cyprus in perpetuity.

24. These statements make a mockery of the words of Mr. Günes, Foreign Minister of Turkey at the time of the invasion, and recent statements by Mr. Kirca, former representative of Turkey to the United Nations, in the Security Council that "the Turkish armed forces will remain on the territory of the Federated State until the conclusion of the final agreement between all the parties concerned" [*see 2405th meeting, para. 116*].

25. It should be stressed in this respect that the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions call for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops. That is the solemn demand of this body. No qualifications exist for their withdrawal, other than that it has to be immediate. Thus, by the Turkish insistence on the pretext of effective protection, the international community, including the Greek Cypriot side, is asked to accept something which is contrary to the provisions of the relevant Assembly and Council resolutions. These Council resolutions are mandatory, binding on all Member States, on the Secretary-General himself and of course on the aggressor and its victim.

26. As if all that did not constitute enough evidence of the hardening of the Turkish positions, a further undermining of the initiative of the Secretary-General is now promoted by the Turkish side through certain statements which block future implementation of the three freedoms, namely, those of movement, of settlement and of ownership of land. That, in fact, amounts to a negation of the right of the people of Cyprus—irrespective of ethnic background—to move about freely in their own country, after a solution is reached.

27. These Turkish positions, while violating internationally accepted principles of human rights, are also contrary to the letter and the spirit of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, particularly Council resolutions 365 (1974), 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), which not only provide for the return of all refugees to their homes in safety but also safeguard the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots.

28. The Turkish insistence, on the other hand, that even after an agreement is reached Turkey should maintain its military presence in the island, in spite of the aggression it has committed against the Republic of Cyprus, amounts to forcing the victim of an assault to employ the protective services of the attacker.

29. There were also repeated statements to the effect that the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, being an "independent State", is entitled to enter into treaties with or seek recognition by other States. The creation of a central bank, which we have exposed in past meetings of this forum as a separatist and partitionist act, and the recent announcement that the bank will begin shortly to issue currency are in line with the scheme of so-called separate independence. I shall not refer to the assurances given again in this body, after the announcement of the creation of a so-called central bank in 1982, that it could not be a separatist act since the most important element of a central bank, that of issuing currency, was lacking. Nor shall I elaborate on the now-ludicrous argument advanced by Turkey, right after the attempted secession of November 1983, that the sole aim of Mr. Denktaş was simply to create a component State of a Federal Republic in Cyprus; I need not do so, since the sinister partitionist and annexationist designs of Turkey are by now clear to all.

30. I shall revert again, however, to the illegality of this offspring of aggression, the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This puppet has no territory of its own other than the areas occupied by the Turkish troops, the latter having only recently uprooted the indigenous Greek Cypriot community, constituting 82 per cent of the population in the areas, and having implanted thousands of settlers from the mainland of Turkey in the homes and lands of those expelled. To hear, therefore, the representatives of Turkey speak in the forums of the United Nations of the need for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is to witness the epitome of absurdity, amounting to a tragic irony of Aeschylean proportions. The right to self-determination, as provided in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), is to be exercised by the people as a whole, and not separately by factions, religious sects, communities or ethnic groups. One can only wonder what the world map would look like if the Turkish way of viewing things were to be accepted. It would be very interesting also to see how Turkey itself would be dismembered, in application of this doctrine.

31. The right to self-determination cannot be exercised on a part of the territory of Cyprus, which is controlled through force of arms by the Turkish military occupying forces, inasmuch as the Republic of Cyprus has *de jure* jurisdiction over this area, as confirmed by a host of United Nations resolutions. Thus, the so-called referendum for a new constitution of the secessionist self-proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" and the so-called elections held in the occupied areas on 5 May and 9 June 1985 are without any legal standing and constitute a mockery of all democratic principles and a violation of international law and universally recognized concepts of human rights.

32. The Turkish insistence on the perpetual presence of the occupation troops in Cyprus not only is contrary to all United Nations resolutions but undermines the hopes for success of the Secretary-General's initiative. The people of Cyprus demand peace and an end to their ordeal. But they are not willing to settle for anything less than peace with justice and freedom, which will allow them to return to their ancestral homes. This means no foreign armies, no dividing lines and no meddling in their internal affairs.

33. As my President stated yesterday, a basic pre-condition for the solution of the problem of Cyprus is the end of occupation—which means the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the Republic of Cyprus before the establishment of an interim Government.

34. As regards Addendum 1 to the Secretary-General's report on his good offices, I should like to state the following.

35. As always, our side has co-operated constructively with the Secretary-General in his current initiative, which began in Vienna in August 1984 and continued with the proximity talks, the high-level meeting and the meetings at a lower level. We shall continue to do so.

36. At the same time we think that we should remind members of the Security Council of the following. After the high-level meeting failed to produce results because of the persistent refusal of Mr. Denktaş to engage in a meaningful dialogue and his rejection of all efforts to reach a compromise, we accepted the Secretary-General's idea for a new high-level meeting. Mr. Denktaş not only did not accept or co-operate, but proceeded instead with a series of illegal acts aimed at entrenching the invalid unilateral declaration of independence that he had been called upon by the Security Council to withdraw and rescind.

37. After Mr. Denktaş similarly rejected a suggestion by the Secretary-General for a joint lower-level meeting, we accepted in the same spirit of compromise another idea put forward by the Secretary-General for separate meetings with the two sides. Several meetings between the Secretary-General or his colleagues and our side were held, including meetings with the President and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus, and as a result we arrived at the April documentation, which was described in the Secretary-General's report of 11 June 1985 [*S/17227/Add.1*] as the formula most likely to lead to a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem.

38. Thus, in less than two months we reached a complete agreement with the Secretary-General, and in the process—and this is well known—we came well within reach of the safety line that demarcates the boundaries between a just and viable solution and a solution that would not be consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the norms of international law, including the minimum standards applicable to fundamental freedoms and democratic rights.

39. The Secretary-General is well aware of our position. Hence, we have no doubt that in deciding on his next step, and with his usual fairness, he will be acting accordingly.

40. In a parallel effort, the Secretariat has for the past eight months been trying to obtain an affirmative reply on the documentation from the Turkish Cypriot side. As early as last June the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the Turkish side had not yet made known

its position on the efforts he had undertaken since January and that he was awaiting its response. The response that the Secretary-General received from the Turkish side months later was, to use an understatement, not positive, and apparently it maintains the same posture to date.

41. All that is needed, therefore, is to persuade the other side to reciprocate our good will by accepting the April documentation as it stands, or in consolidated form, thus paving the way to substantial negotiations and speedy resolution of the Cyprus problem. It is our firm belief that the members of the Security Council, as well as the whole membership of the United Nations, could greatly assist the Secretary-General in obtaining such results.

42. For its part the Government of Cyprus is anxious to reach a negotiated settlement of the problem. It is our most firm belief that the people of Cyprus as a whole stand to benefit from an end to the almost 12 years of military occupation of part of our national territory. Through a just and lasting solution all the people of Cyprus will be able to enjoy once again the blessings of peace and of unimpeded freedom to move and to reside all over the island. Those aspirations of our people and their yearning for the blessings of justice, peace, co-operation and happiness in a Federal Republic of Cyprus are in accord with the relevant United Nations resolutions, the declarations of non-aligned countries and of the Commonwealth and the high-level agreements.

43. In a gesture of good will the Cyprus Government has refrained for the past three sessions of the General Assembly from insisting on a debate on the question of Cyprus. We have done so in order to allow the initiative of the Secretary-General to proceed smoothly. We must not, however, be expected to be the only side which responds to the Secretary-General's suggestion for a moratorium. As we have stated before, our hopes for vindication and justice rest on the United Nations, which constitutes the cornerstone of our foreign policy and the framework within which, we feel, a just and lasting solution of our problem can be found.

44. We are striving to secure implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions, to make Cyprus an island without foreign armies or dividing lines and to rebuild the bridges of co-operation blown up by foreign interference and intervention and by chauvinistic forces of division and confrontation.

45. The Government of Cyprus reiterates its unreserved support for the most commendable efforts of the Secretary-General in the framework of his personal initiative in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. In this respect, I express to him our deepest appreciation of his untiring efforts in seeking a peaceful and just solution to the problem of Cyprus.

46. We commend warmly the valuable and significant contribution of the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Brian Urquhart. His great and meaningful contribution to the United Nations by staunchly defending the purposes and principles of the Charter and labouring to enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the world Organization elevate him to the highest point of distinction for international contribution. Cyprus wishes him well and thanks him warmly for what he has done for its people. We also warmly appreciate the valuable contribution of the Secretary-General's close assistants, Mr. Feissel and Mr. Picco, in their continuous efforts to advance the cause of peace in our country. I pay a special tribute to Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, for the efficient manner in which he pursues his difficult mission.

47. My Government's deep appreciation goes also to Major-General Greindl, Commander of UNFICYP, and to his officers and men for the dedicated manner in which they continue to carry on the duties entrusted to them by the Security Council. In referring to UNFICYP, I should of course like to express our warmest feelings of gratitude and appreciation to all the friendly Governments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, have enabled UNFICYP to continue to render its indispensable peace-keeping services in Cyprus.

48. Before concluding, I should like to express the hope that the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus will proceed urgently with its humanitarian task of ascertaining definitively the fate of the hundreds of missing. This is a moral obligation which we owe to their families.

49. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Greece, upon whom I now call.

50. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on the assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December. I am certain that, with your well-known tact and diplomatic experience, you will ably carry out your difficult task. It would be remiss of me if I failed to take this opportunity to thank the President of the Council for November, the representative of Australia, Mr. Woolcott, for the really exemplary way in which he guided the Council.

51. The representative of Cyprus has dealt extensively with many facets of the Cyprus problem. On the occasion of today's Council meeting, I should simply like to reiterate certain fundamental positions of my Government regarding the continuing occupation of northern Cyprus by the Turkish army. In other words, I should like to address one of the most substantive aspects of the Cyprus question.

52. Apart from Greece's special relationship with the people of Cyprus, the interest of my country stems also from the fact that it is one of the guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus. My Government remains unswervingly convinced that no solution to the Cyprus question can be envisaged as long as it does not provide for the withdrawal of the Turkish army from the island before any transitional machinery is set up in the Republic in accordance with an eventual agreement. Furthermore, a system of effective guarantees should be agreed upon. The agreement should fairly allay the fears of the Turkish Cypriot community that its rights might be abused by the Greek Cypriot community. It should equally protect the over-

whelming Greek Cypriot majority of the island and effectively safeguard the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus against any further Turkish threats.

53. As far as the security of the Turkish Cypriot community is concerned, this goal could be achieved convincingly through workable constitutional guarantees and an extension of the presence of UNFICYP under a new mandate for a substantial period of time. This arrangement has been repeatedly proposed both by President Kyprianou and by Prime Minister Papandreou.

54. As far as the security of the Greek Cypriot majority is concerned, the withdrawal of the Turkish army would be a positive development. Allow me, in this respect, to quote from a major foreign policy statement delivered by Prime Minister Papandreou before Parliament on 6 December: "We cannot accept a transitional period, a provisional Government, before the last Turkish soldier has withdrawn and the occupation of Cyprus is ended." And he added: "If Turkey becomes a guarantor Power we will not agree to become a guarantor Power as well . . . our proposal [Greece's proposal] is to have guarantees from a group of States from East, West and the third world."

55. The rationale behind this statement is more than obvious. It would be unwise and dangerous for Greece to guarantee a solution which not only might prove constitutionally unworkable but which would also provide for the presence of the Turkish army in the island under one form or the other—and allow me to stress most particularly this last point. Such a structure would most probably soon collapse, leading to a major crisis that would threaten peace in the area. I am certain that considerations of this nature are not alien to those who provide ideas for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

56. In this context, allow me to refer to the report of the Secretary-General in document S/17657/Add.1, dated 9 December 1985, which we read with the attention it deserves, particularly its paragraph 10. I should like to point out that, as it seems to us, any agreement which would not explicitly provide for the major question of the withdrawal of the Turkish army before any transitional machinery is set up would not only turn the whole initiative into an exercise in futility; it would also strengthen the position of the aggressor in Cyprus. Obviously, the United Nations cannot have such an intention.

57. As far as the constitutional aspects of the Cyprus question are concerned, this is not a problem in which Greece is involved. I shall confine myself to saying simply that, in our view, any solution should provide for a structure of the State in full conformity with the universally accepted democratic principles, that it should not ignore the element of the composition of the population and that it should be functional, in order that greater tragedies may be averted in the future.

58. The Greek Government has consistently supported and continues to support the initiative of the Secretary-General. We deeply appreciate his untiring efforts and his dedication in carrying out a highly difficult mission. We sincerely wish that he will be able, through the procedure he has initiated. to bridge the gap between the positions of the two sides. However, in view of the extremely important concessions made by President Kyprianou—which may have gone even beyond the safety limit for the Greek Cypriot community and the State of Cyprus—this is the time for Turkey, we believe, to take a decisive step.

59. It is well known to the Council that we are already, by too many years, late in our efforts to restore the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, which finds itself *de facto* split in two. It is high time for a solution which will enable the Cypriot people in their entirety, irrespective of their religious or national affiliations—all of them: Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Latins, Maronites—to enjoy the benefits of peace: freedom and prosperity.

60. In concluding, I should like to express our deep appreciation to Major-General Greindl and the officers and men of the Force, as well as to the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General. They have performed their duties with dedication and in an impeccable manner, and we are grateful to them. Our particular thanks are also addressed to all the friendly countries that for many years have been contributing with troops and funds, thus making possible the continuing and most valuable presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus.

61. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker on my list is Mr. Özer Koray, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

62. Mr. KORAY: Allow me to thank you, Mr. President, and through you, all the distinguished members of the Council for granting me the opportunity to participate in the deliberations on the extension of the stay of UNFICYP in Cyprus for a period of six months.

63. The Turkish Cypriot side values very highly opportunities that enable it to air its views on the question of Cyprus, for such opportunities are few and far between. This inequitable distribution, between the two sides in Cyprus, of the right to be heard and to present one's case lies today at the heart of the failure to bring about a negotiated solution to the issues between the two peoples in Cyprus. The sooner this fact is perceived by the international community, the better will be the prospects of bringing these issues to a mutually acceptable, satisfactory conclusion. In the absence of such a perception, the Greek Cypriot side will be more than happy to prolong the issue and thus keep on monopolizing the title of "Government of Cyprus", which it contrived to usurp 22 years ago, in 1963.

64. It is an irony which never ceases to astonish the Turkish Cypriot side that the representative of the side which for years tried by all the means at its disposal to destroy the bicommunal independence of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus and to turn it into a colony of Greece has come, by default and with the connivance of others, to speak for the Republic of Cyprus and claims to represent the whole of its population, while by contrast the repre-

sentative of the side whose selfless resistance and courageous struggle gave birth to that Republic and prevented its colonization has come today to speak before this body under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. For us this is a very irksome and unjust state of affairs, without a single shred of constitutionality, which must be corrected if the way to a negotiated solution is to be opened.

65. I would hazard the guess that, despite the rule under which I have been invited to address the Council today, everybody present in this Chamber, including Mr. Moushoutas, silently acknowledges the fact that Mr. Moushoutas and I, barring our disguises, are in reality speaking as the representatives of our respective sides or peoples—no more, no less. The only difference, then, is the guise in which the Greek Cypriot side has been allowed to masquerade since 1963, the fateful year of the Greek Cypriot coup against the bicommunal Government of Cyprus.

66. To those who cannot bear the voice and presence in this building of a few Turkish Cypriots, we promise one thing only: the righteous voice of the Turkish people of Cyprus will grow ever stronger; we shall not be silenced, nor shall our presence be removed by trickery.

67. We have just witnessed a desperate attempt by Mr. Moushoutas to rewrite history, an unquestionably trying task by any yardstick. He is not alone in failing dismally in this, for his predecessors have tried and failed before him. He can, if he wishes, find solace in that fact. Yet this may—and we hope it will—open the eyes of the Greek Cypriot side and help it see that its customary role of profusely disseminating falsehoods and malicious allegations against the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in international forums will no longer pay dividends, because it has been stretched and exploited to its ultimate limits for so long—a full 22 years, to be precise.

68. Year after year this illegal entity, in the guise of an aggrieved party, has trotted round the globe repeating its worn-out, hackneyed arguments and trumped-up charges against the Turkish people of Cyprus, whom it has persecuted for so long but failed to enslave, and against Turkey, whose timely intervention caught it red-handed and put a stop to its abominable crimes against the Turkish Cypriots and the island of Cyprus. Today we have heard more of the same, and we deem it to be not worthy of response. Suffice it to say that those of us who wish to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful solution of the issues between the two sides in Cyprus should do all we can to bring an end to this dismal performance, replete with Byzantine antics.

69. The Greek Cypriot leadership should be made to understand once and for all that the time has come for it to make the crucial choice between, on the one hand, the Secretary-General's efforts and initiatives within the context of his mission of good offices in pursuance of Security Council resolution 367 (1975), and, on the other, the continuation of its tendentious activities in international forums, falsely portraying its illegal administration as the Government of Cyprus, capable of representing and speaking for both sides in Cyprus. In other words, the choice is between peace through negotiations on an equal footing with the elected representatives of the Turkish people of Cyprus and the constant pursuit of unrealistic, one-sided, condemnatory resolutions harmful to peace and reconciliation.

70. Does the recent behaviour and attitude of the Greek Cypriot leadership provide any hope for the future? The answer, unfortunately, is no. Having rejected the 27 November 1984 draft agreement—which was the result of four months of high-level proximity talks between the two sides—at the summit meeting of 17 January 1985, convened at the behest of Mr. Papandreou, the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Kyprianou, and his administration displayed no feelings of regret in the succeeding months. Even the continuing initiative and efforts of the Secretary-General to arrive at a new document which would be acceptable to both sides have not sufficed to make the Greek Cypriot leaders desist from further internationalization and exploitation of the conflict in the absence of the legitimate representatives of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

71. The resolution of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Luanda from 4 to 7 September 1985, which was adopted at the instigation of the Greek Cypriot side and in the absence of the legitimate representatives of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, is a prime example of the unchanging Greek Cypriot policy of making use of unrealistic, irrelevant resolutions extracted from international forums to achieve on paper, at least, what they could not achieve on the ground by force of arms—that is, the transformation of the island of Cyprus into a place where the Turkish Cypriots will not be allowed to stand upright, much less to rule. After Luanda, the scene moved to the Bahamas, to the Commonwealth Conference held from 16 to 22 October 1985. There we witnessed a repeat performance.

72. The Greek Cypriot side took those steps consciously and in full knowledge of their possible negative repercussions on the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General to open the way to the result-oriented dialogue which had been blocked by Mr. Kyprianou at the 17 January summit.

73. The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus cannot, with all its good will, ignore, forgive or appraise lightly the actions of the other side or the end product of such actions, for those resolutions have all the ingredients that could signal the end of the initiatives of the Secretary-General, or at least render them meaningless. We believe that the Secretary-General himself is apprehensive about the effects of such actions and resolutions on his initiatives, knowing of course that the content of those resolutions runs counter to, and more often than not rejects, the various agreements concluded between the two sides in Cyprus under the aegis of the United Nations, on the basis of which the Secretary-General is mounting his initiatives. Our side's evaluation of the real intentions of the Greek and Greek Cypriot camp is being vindicated by these actions; that camp has not yet abandoned its old habit of viewing Cyprus as a Greek island, let alone accepted us as equal partners in a bizonal, bicommunal federal republic.

74. In order the better to understand the Greek Cypriot leadership's behaviour and to place it in the right perspective, we would be well advised to refer to the speech made on 7 October 1985 by the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou, to his party's parliamentary group. On that occasion Mr. Papandreou said, *inter alia*:

> "For a long time there have been initiatives within the context of the mission of good offices of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. I must point out that those initiatives are never in accordance with the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and declarations . . .
>
> "Those initiatives consist of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar's attempts to find a negotiated solution between the two communities. I say 'two communities' on purpose, because the mediation attempts have created such an atmosphere . . . For us, the Cyprus problem has always been and remains an international issue. It is not a dispute between two communities."

Mr. Papandreou then goes on to complain about his opposition and third parties blaming him and the Greek Cypriot side for lack of progress in the negotiations and contacts and adds, "These constant accusations are the reason for Cyprus remaining and acting within the framework of Cuéllar's initiatives".

75. That lucid exposé by Mr. Papandreou tells it all. It explains with clarity why intercommunal talks and the initiatives and efforts of the Secretary-General have not succeeded. It confesses that the Greek and Greek Cypriot side has all along been paying only lip-service to the intercommunal negotiations and to the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. And it contains the explanation for Mr. Kyprianou's rejection of the 27 November draft agreement. I believe some members will agree with me in concluding that for the Greek and Greek Cypriot side perpetuation of the conflict is an end in itself.

76. Despite all this, the Turkish people of Cyprus and its elected leadership, displaying extreme patience, preserved their faith in the initiative of the Secretary-General and continued in this period to give it full support and co-operation. Notwithstanding the almost overwhelming pressure not to do so, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus kept open its channels of communication with Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, with a view to helping him advance his initiative after the setback of 17 January suffered at the hands of Mr. Kyprianou.

77. As a result of those contacts, the Secretary-General invited President Denktaş to further consultations in New York on 11 and 12 September 1985. Two days of sincere talks encouraged the Secretary-General to release the following statement:

> "The Secretary-General has had most useful talks with His Excellency Mr. Denktaş. These talks will be helpful to him in assessing the present situation and in deciding upon the next step to be taken by the Secretary-General in the near future. The Secretary-General will continue to be in touch with both sides."

78. The Turkish Cypriot side then responded positively to an invitation by the Secretary-General to further consultations at a technical level in London on 18 and 19 November. Those consultations, too, were found useful by the Secretary-General. Further contacts are anticipated.

79. The Turkish people of Cyprus, confident of the justice of its struggle and totally committed to a peaceful solution of its differences with the Greek Cypriot side, will continue, as before, to extend to the Secretary-General its full and ungrudging co-operation in his efforts within the context of his mission of good offices.

80. The Government and people of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus know that their State has legally, constitutionally and morally a sound basis and believe that it can be used as a starting point for a return to legality and legitimacy in the whole of Cyprus. Only in this way can the illegality and illegitimacy that have pervaded Cyprus for 22 years be removed.

81. We invite the Greek Cypriot leadership to take a step back at this late hour from the edge of the precipice and see that its interest, too, lies in reconciling its differences with the Turkish Cypriot side. That reconciliation can be achieved without undue sacrifices on its part, because all its ingredients and elements are found in the various agreements which the two sides have already made over the years. It need only respect and implement the agreements it has made with us. Acceptance of this path by the Greek Cypriot leadership will, we are sure, lead us to the establishment of a bicommunal, bi-zonal federal republic, guaranteeing equal political status and the legitimate rights and aspirations of both sides in Cyprus.

82. The Turkish guarantee, which has proved so effective in bringing the Turkish Cypriot people and the island of Cyprus back from the brink of destruction and colonization, is the only element which will safeguard the workability and durability of such a settlement. We cannot forgo this guarantee, and the Greek Cypriot side cannot reasonably oppose it, unless it harbours ill intentions for the future.

83. Rejection of the guarantee or attempts to circumvent it by new-fangled means destroy the chances of success in reconciling the differences between the two sides in Cyprus. This attitude, together with the pre-condition of the withdrawal of all the Turkish troops before a solution is found in Cyprus, serves only those whose interests are juxtaposed with the perpetuation of the conflict and anti-Turkish enmity. It only serves the self-interest of Prime Minister Papandreou, who, in a speech to his Parliament on 6 December, only two days before the Greek Cypriot elections in the south, served the world with another clear notice of his determination to hamper all efforts towards a negotiated, satisfactory solution of the conflict in Cyprus.

84. In that speech Mr. Papandreou, *inter alia*, warned the Greek Cypriot community against a *rapprochement* with the Turkish Cypriot side through negotiations within the context of the Secretary-General's mission of good of-

fices, which, in a previous speech I have already quoted, he had said he rejected. He also gave a stern warning to the Greek Cypriot community that he would have no qualms about interfering in its internal affairs. He took pains to influence the outcome of the Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections in favour of Mr. Kyprianou and the rejectionist front. The election results show that he was clearly successful in this regard. As the dust settles in south Cyprus, we wonder whether Mr. Kyprianou and the other beneficiaries will ever be allowed to forget the help they received from this indiscreet tirade by Mr. Papandreou.

85. The crucial question which is being pondered is whether the Secretary-General—with so many unwarranted broadsides directed at his initiatives by Mr. Papandreou, applauded by the present Greek Cypriot leadership—will be able to continue with his initiatives. The international press clearly sees the results as a setback.

86. Turning now to the resolution just adopted, I wish to stress the following points.

87. The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus finds itself once again in the position of rejecting the resolution *in toto*. While we do not doubt the Council's sincerity in desiring an amicable solution to the problems between the two sides in Cyprus, we believe that the resolution will not help bridge the gap between the parties to the conflict. On the contrary, in the light of the foregoing, it will increase the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side, seeing that its pretence is once again connived at by the international community. This will almost certainly be the result of the reference to "Government of Cyprus" in the resolution.

88. The administration to which the resolution refers as the "Government of Cyprus" is nothing more than an illegal, usurping entity, which by hook or by crook and by default has, as I have stated before, managed to conceal its evil character behind the title of "Government of Cyprus". Yes, there was once a legitimate Government of Cyprus, constitutionally, legally and morally equipped to represent the whole of Cyprus, but that Government, some may remember, was toppled by force of arms by its Greek Cypriot wing, which then ejected the Turkish Cypriots from all the organs of that Government. Thus the Government of Cyprus, as decreed by the now defunct 1960 Constitution, ceased to exist and the 1960 Constitution was also shelved. Those of us who are inclined to look for *faits accomplis* in Cyprus would do well to remember and look into this case, because it is the only *fait accompli* which we know to have taken place in Cyprus and it is a *fait accompli par excellence*, to which the Turkish people of Cyprus has not succumbed and never shall.

89. Feather-bedding of this illegal entity by third parties may give it an edge in its international and bilateral dealings, but at the end of the day the decisive factor is our righteous non-recognition of it. Let me stress once again that unless that usurped seat is relieved of its burden there will not be much use in hoping that the Greek Cypriot leadership will engage in a serious dialogue with its counterpart, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, in order to find solutions to our remaining differences.

90. Similarly, the reference in the fourth preambular paragraph to "other relevant resolutions" is unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side—since the Turkish Cypriot side has either rejected *in toto* or accepted subject to reservations the resolutions in question.

91. Concerning the reference in paragraph 2 to the "mission of good offices" of the Secretary-General, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would like to state that it understands that mission to be emanating from Security Council resolution 367 (1975), in which case my Government pledges its full support to it. As before, we shall be ready and willing to co-operate fully with any initiative the Secretary-General may wish to undertake within the context of his mission of good offices.

92. In paragraph 3, a reference is made to the "present mandate" of UNFICYP. As the Secretary-General himself states in paragraph 7 of his report to the Council [*S/17657*] this mandate "was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities" and as such, after 21 years, the mandate in question is not compatible with the radically changed conditions and circumstances of today. We believe, therefore, that a reappraisal of UNFICYP's mandate is long overdue and necessary.

93. Despite its unavoidable rejection *in toto* of the present resolution for the reasons stated above, the Turkish Cypriot side is nevertheless favourably disposed to accept the presence of UNFICYP on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the same basis as that stated in June 1985. Thus our position continues to be that the principle, the scope, the modalities and the procedures of co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP shall be based only on decisions which shall be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

94. We earnestly hope that Governments contributing troops will display a neutral stance in the dispute between the two peoples. I do not wish to go into the details of the matter, but I can only say that the Secretary-General has already been informed of the issue. We shall keep this matter under review in the light of some recent developments which have caused serious misgivings.

95. Before concluding, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity once again to convey to Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar my Government's profound appreciation and thanks for his untiring efforts within the context of his mission of good offices and for the balanced and egalitarian way in which he pursues his contacts with both sides in Cyprus. Our gratitude is his due. Our sincere thanks and appreciation go to Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, who in his long years of invaluable services to the United Nations has earned the respect of all the parties he has had to deal with. We in Northern Cyprus respect him very much and wish him well in his future endeavours. Our appreciation

and thanks go also to the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. James Holger, to Major-General Guenther Greindl, UNFICYP Commander, and the officers and the men under his command for their understanding and the efficient way in which they carried out their duties during this period. We wish also to thank the members of the Secretariat dealing with the Cyprus issue. We commend Mr. Gustave Feissel and Mr. Giandomenico Picco for their dedication in discharging their responsibilities. Lastly, I take this opportunity to wish Mr. Marrack Goulding every success in his new exalted post.

96. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

97. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): I am grateful to you, Sir, and the other members of the Council for granting me this opportunity of making a statement. I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December. I am confident that your experience and wisdom will be invaluable in guiding the deliberations of the Council to constructive results. May I also pay a warm tribute to Mr. Richard Woolcott, who presided over the Council with distinction and diligence in November.

98. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus will soon be entering its twenty-second year of existence. The Turkish Cypriots fortunately no longer face the tragic situation which prompted the creation and the stationing of the Force in the island during the dark days of 1964. UNFICYP's continued presence after 21 years has to be viewed in the light of the radically changed circumstances in the island and in the context of its role in support of peace-making efforts. Because of this role in particular, we would have wished this resolution on UNFICYP to have a content enjoying the support of all the directly interested parties.

99. I do not need to repeat here our fundamental objections to the contents of the resolution just adopted by the Council. They are well known by the members of the Council and continue to remain valid. Mr. Özer Koray has reaffirmed the position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the present resolution and on the modalities of UNFICYP's presence in Northern Cyprus. I only wish to reconfirm the Turkish Government's complete agreement with this position.

100. We understand, of course, the wish of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to keep under constant review its position on the presence of UNFICYP, in particular in the light of recent developments which might impair the impartiality of some troop-contributing countries.

101. I should like to thank the Secretary-General for his present report, which reflects the continuing efforts he is deploying in the framework of his mission of good offices for a peaceful solution to the long-standing problems between the two sides in the island. The Turkish Government has consistently supported and encouraged the Secretary-General in his mission, and we are grateful to him for pursuing his good offices. We shall certainly continue to play a constructive role in support of an agreed settlement between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots—the two peoples of Cyprus who have to reconcile their differences through negotiations in a manner which satisfies the legitimate concerns and interests of both sides on the basis of political equality.

102. I do not wish to go into the substance of the matter at this stage since the members of the Council have been kept informed of the efforts begun by the Secretary-General in August 1984, which culminated in the joint high-level meeting of 17 January 1985. The unfortunate conclusion of that meeting has unavoidably continued to influence subsequent developments.

103. As the Secretary-General notes in his report, Turkish Cypriot views were communicated to him extensively on 8 August 1985 by President Denktaş, who has subsequently met the Secretary-General in New York on 12 and 13 September. The Secretary-General remarked that he would be in touch with both sides with regard to the next step he would take. At the suggestion of the Secretary-General, talks were held at the technical level between the Turkish Cypriot negotiator and his advisers and the Secretary-General's staff in London in November. The Secretary-General had also similar talks with the Greek Cypriot side. We hope that these discussions will enable the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices with a greater chance of success. I must say, however, that certain recent developments and statements of Greek Cypriot and Greek leaders cannot be reconciled with a genuine desire to contribute to a negotiated settlement.

104. In October, Prime Minister Papandreou, speaking before the parliamentary group of PASOK, expressed his opposition to the content and scope of the Secretary-General's efforts on Cyprus. Then the Secretary-General was obliged to remind Mr. Papandreou of the basis of his mission of good offices, as well as of the statement by the President of the Security Council calling upon all parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General.

105. More recently, Mr. Papandreou made a statement in the Parliament which is contrary to the basic premises on which the Secretary-General's efforts are based. That statement came on 6 December, just before the Greek Cypriot elections held on 8 December. I do not wish to elaborate on this timing, but its purpose was clearly diagnosed in the international press. Let me just quote here a paragraph from *The New York Times* of 9 December about the consequences of the important support Mr. Kyprianou received from Mr. Papandreou:

> "The result of this competition of patriotic claims, according to diplomats, has been to move the entire Greek Cypriot political spectrum to less conciliatory attitudes. This is believed to make even less promising Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts to bring Mr. Kyprianou and Rauf Denktaş, the unchallenged leader of the Turkish community, back to New York for another attempt at ending the 11-year stalemate."

106. The latest statement by Mr. Papandreou cannot be characterized as anything but a very rigid stand against any negotiated settlement. It is significant that the Greek opposition leader stated in the Parliament that he radically disagreed with Mr. Papandreou's views on the Cyprus problem, adding that there were possibilities for a just settlement of the issue in the context of the Secretary-General's initiative. The opposition leader spoke again today and accused Mr. Papandreou of undermining the efforts of the Secretary-General. Obviously, Mr. Kyprianou fully supports Mr. Papandreou. He expressed his gratification at the Greek Prime Minister's position.

107. In the circumstances, it is clear that progress can be made only if the Greek Cypriots and Greek leaders change their basic positions and come to the conclusion that they really want a negotiated agreement. If they compete with each other in making militant speeches totally irrelevant to the reality of the situation and the wish of the international community, they will not even fool their own public opinion, as evidenced by the reactions in Greece and southern Cyprus.

108. It is incumbent upon Turkey and Greece to do their utmost to facilitate and encourage an agreement between the two sides in Cyprus through the good offices mission of the Secretary-General. That is what Turkey is doing, and it must be clear to everybody that we shall not support any other negotiating process. If Greece is unhappy with the Secretary-General's mission and the prospect of a settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the principles agreed upon by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, it should then at least refrain from interfering in a negative and destructive manner. But at present the Greek Government is actively intervening in the negotiating process, with the obvious objective of disrupting it. There are even from time to time ominous signs of an intent to broaden this intervention to the military field. At this stage, we thought it would be useful to call the attention of the Security Council to the dangers involved in present Greek policies.

109. Indeed, the statement of the representative of Greece has confirmed our misgivings. It has made clear that Mr. Papandreou wishes to impose the terms of a settlement in Cyprus. Mr. Dountas has, in fact, presented us with a detailed scenario made in Athens. It is obvious that Mr. Papandreou considers that he has the right to veto an agreement between the two negotiating parties that is not to his liking. This statement by Mr. Dountas is the most convincing proof that the main obstacle today to a negotiated agreement between the two Cypriot sides is Greece. Greece is the cause of the tragedy in Cyprus; Mr. Papandreou should not aggravate it further.

110. There was a torrent of vicious and unfounded allegations in the statement by Mr. Moushoutas. It is clear that he made a special effort to surpass even his previous statements in this regard. Does he really believe that such intense rhetoric will distract the attention of the Security Council from the real question? Is the Greek Cypriot Administration willing to negotiate an agreement within the framework proposed by the Secretary-General? If not, the abundant verbiage to which we have been exposed is just a waste of time.

111. I shall therefore not waste more of the Council's time by replying to Mr. Moushoutas. Let me just clarify one point. The draft agreement submitted by the Secretary-General in January 1985 foresaw negotiations on a timetable for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces—not only Turkish forces. The Turkish Cypriots accepted this draft agreement, but the Greek Cypriots rejected it. Therefore, whatever has been said here about the withdrawal of Turkish forces is pure demagoguery.

112. In conclusion, I wish to express again our thanks to the Secretary-General and to assure him of my Government's full support for his mission of good offices. We hope his efforts within this framework will be successful. I should like to express our appreciation to Major-General Guenther Greindl, Commander of UNFICYP, and his staff. I should like also to thank Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, as well as the Secretariat members dealing with Cyprus here in New York. They all enjoy the confidence of the Turkish side, and this has very particular importance in the context of this problem.

113. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Cyprus has asked to be allowed to make a statement, and I now call on him.

114. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Unlike the representative of Turkey, I should like to take a few minutes of the Council's time in order to set the record straight and defend my Government and people. I do so in the hope that if certain facts are made abundantly clear to the Council and the problem we are facing is seen in its right perspective, a positive contribution will be made to the efforts under way to achieve a just and lasting solution.

115. As I have done at previous meetings of the Security Council, I shall address my remarks only to the representative of Turkey. It is not my intention to disregard—nor do I believe the members of this body will disregard—the statement of the individual who was allowed to speak in his personal capacity under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure—and then proceeded only to abuse that right, in order to complement the voice of the occupying Power. In spite of that statement by him, I feel that Turkey is the principal and that Turkey made both statements; for he who does things through surrogates actually does them himself.

116. I would only say that if Mr. Koray sheds the guise of the surrogate, one sees that he is in reality a Cypriot. I sincerely consider him as such—a member of a community which is an inseparable part of our people.

117. The representative of Turkey, through Mr. Koray and in his own statement, went to some length to play down the importance of the issue of the withdrawal of the occupation troops. His motive is obvious. Take away the forces of occupation, allow the Cypriot people to move freely all over their country, deprive Turkey of any pretext on which to allege grounds to be present for an invasion, and the whole Turkish thesis of presenting their Attila as a peacemaker falls flat on its face.

118. The Council will no doubt appreciate that Turkey and its few apologists could not succeed in their diversionary tactics. They could not impress upon the Council and the world at large their fallacious notion that there is no need to pay attention to little details such as the withdrawal of the Turkish forces of occupation and the application to Cyprus of the minimum prerequisite for every State structure, whether federal or unitary. I consider the three freedoms to be a minimum: freedom of citizens to move about, freedom to settle and freedom to own property, especially if they were deprived of such properties by some invaders, as I said in my statement, and settlers from Turkey.

119. But if I may be allowed to take a more sober view towards these Turkish assertions, I would strongly submit that Ankara's spokesmen are out of order and in utter contempt of the Security Council whenever they present themselves in the Council, making propositions and propagating partition, secession, perpetuation of the military occupation and the prevention or curtailment of basic human rights to the people of Cyprus as a whole.

120. The Turkish side complains about the Luanda declaration and the Commonwealth declaration. They say they are one-sided and they are therefore not bound by them. May I remind the Council that Turkey voted for resolution 3212 (XXIX) in the General Assembly. That resolution, as may be recalled, was later endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974) and made mandatory. Does the representative of Turkey consider that that has nothing to do with reality? Having voted for that resolution, what did Turkey do to implement it? Have the Turkish occupation troops withdrawn, as provided for in the resolution? Has the demand for respect for the sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus been met? Have the refugees been allowed to return to their homes and lands in safety, as is provided for in the resolution? Those are the points to which the representative of Turkey should address himself.

121. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Greece.

122. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like to refer to a few of the statements and remarks made by Mr. Türkmen.

123. My distinguished colleague, referring to the statements of Prime Minister Papandreou, the gist of which is that the Turkish army should withdraw from Cyprus before any transitional Government is set up—that is the gist of all the statements of Prime Minister Papandreou—Mr. Türkmen maintained that those statements are irreconcilable with the initiative of the Secretary-General, that those statements are against a negotiated settlement. He also said that those statements were undermining—perhaps I am not using the exact words, but I am giving the gist—the initiative of the Secretary-General.

124. Allow me to attempt to put the record straight. We are not against the initiative of the Secretary-General. A few moments ago I had the opportunity to reiterate our position with regard to the initiative. I said quite clearly, I dare say unequivocally, that the Greek Government "has consistently supported and continues to support the initiative of the Secretary-General", and I went on to say that we "appreciate his untiring efforts and his dedication in carrying out a highly difficult mission". And I concluded that part by saying that we sincerely hoped he would be able through the procedure he has initiated to bridge the gap between the positions of the sides. That is what I said, and it does not conform with what Mr. Türkmen maintains I said.

125. But apart from that I should like to make it clear that not only do we support the Secretary-General's initiative; we have also made a great many positive contributions within the framework of numerous contacts in order to see that initiative succeed. But what we are against—and I want to be extremely emphatic on this—is the continuation of the occupation of Cyprus by Turkish troops. In this we are both rigid and unswerving.

126. And I should like to ask Mr. Türkmen why he construes the statement that we want to see the occupation troops withdrawn from Cyprus as being irreconcilable with the initiative of the Secretary-General. Does he believe that the Secretary-General is in favour of continuation of the occupation, or perhaps, which is most probable, does he wish to give us a clear hint that the Turkish troops will not withdraw from Cyprus?

127. There is another point I should like to touch on very briefly. Mr. Koray said that the Prime Minister of Greece, in one of his recent statements to the Parliament, had warned the Greek Cypriots against any *rapprochement* between the two communities. That is absolutely incorrect. On no occasion has the Prime Minister said or even hinted that he is against *rapprochement* between the two communities. The only explanation I can find is that perhaps Mr. Koray did not have time to read the statement of Mr. Papandreou and he found it convenient to draft a statement of the Prime Minister to match his own purposes.

128. I am a bit hesitant to refer to one of the remarks made by Mr. Türkmen. He referred to a statement by the leader of the Greek opposition criticizing the Prime Minister. In Greece, as in many other countries, very often the opposition criticizes the Government. I am really sorry that the situation in Turkey does not permit me to quote from statements of the Turkish opposition.

129. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

130. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): First of all I wish to assure Mr. Dountas that I am going to send him some statements from opposition leaders in Turkey. We accept that there is democracy in Greece. Democracy in Greece came after the tragedy Cyprus underwent in 1974, when the Greek dictatorship tried to invade the island. It was thanks to the Turkish intervention and the consequences of that intervention—the uproar in Greek public opinion, the reaction of the Greek people—that brought democracy to Greece. I think it is not, therefore, very proper for

Mr. Dountas to try to intimate that there is no democracy in Turkey. There is democracy today both in Turkey and in Greece.

131. Now, perhaps one reason why, in Turkey, the opposition leader is not criticizing the policy of the Turkish Government on Cyprus is that the Turkish Government's policy in that respect is very clear. We just support the good offices mission of the Secretary-General. We do not enter into the substance of the matter. We do not want to influence in any negative manner the ongoing negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

132. Mr. Dountas says that he sees nothing in what Mr. Papandreou has said that is against the initiative of the Secretary-General, that he has paid his tribute to the Secretary-General. I did not say that he has not paid compliments to the Secretary-General. What I said is that Prime Minister Papandreou, by taking the positions that he has taken, is prejudging the outcome of the negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus. Mr. Dountas himself provided us with a detailed agreement proposed by Mr. Papandreou, but Mr. Papandreou and the Greek Government are not direct negotiators. The negotiators are, on the one hand, the Greek Cypriots and, on the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots.

133. Mr. Moushoutas spoke at length about resolution 3212 (XXIX) and other United Nations resolutions and of the fact that Turkey has not implemented them, and he said that all those resolutions were relevant to our discussion here today. They are not. He has only to read the resolution just adopted. The only operative paragraph with regard to negotiations, paragraph 2, requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 31 May 1986. I do not see any reference there to other resolutions. His statement, therefore, was totally irrelevant.

134. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Greece has asked to make a statement, and I call upon him to do so.

135. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): It is with reluctance that I have asked to speak again. I should like to say that by quoting what my Prime Minister said and in what I said I am not prejudging the outcome of the negotiations. Greece—and I made this clear at the very outset of my statement—in the capacity of guarantor of the Republic of Cyprus, which means in the same capacity as Turkey, felt that it had the right and the duty to make clear its position with regard to this very important international aspect of the Cyprus problem and to say to all the members of the Council that one of the fundamental positions of Greece with regard to the solution of the Cyprus problem is the withdrawal of the Turkish army. We did not impose that solution on the Secretary-General; we did not impose that position on anybody. We simply stated our position, as it is our inalienable right to do.

136. As to the gratitude we owe to the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish army, because through that invasion democracy was restored in Greece—I would assure Mr. Türkmen that in the list of the benefactors of democracy, after the name of Pericles we will inscribe the name of the Turkish army.

137. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Cyprus has asked to make a statement, and I now call upon him.

138. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Withdrawal of foreign troops—as a matter of fact, occupation troops, as they are described in relevant United Nations resolutions—is not prejudging the outcome of the negotiations. This is a solemn demand in solemn decisions of this body, and Turkey has not implemented those resolutions. We are here to renew the mandate of UNFICYP. The question is, why is UNFICYP there? UNFICYP is there because Turkey again did not comply with decisions and resolutions of this body. I would also invite the attention of the representative of Turkey to the resolution just adopted, and specifically to the paragraph that states: "Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) and other relevant resolutions".

139. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Before calling upon the representative of Turkey, who has asked to make a statement, I would like to appeal to the various representatives. We have listened to you most attentively. Like my colleagues here, I am convinced that it would be pointless to prolong this debate. It is not today, in hearing the different views with which we are very familiar, that we will be able to resolve the problem.

140. I call upon the representative of Turkey.

141. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): First of all, when Mr. Dountas speaks of the Turkish "invasion" and the debt owed to the Turkish army, he forgets one thing. He forgets that in 1974 the late Archbishop Makarios came to the Council and said that he was facing, not a Turkish invasion, but a Greek invasion. This is in the records of the Security Council for its 1780th meeting. What happened in 1974 was a Turkish intervention within the framework of the Treaty of Guarantee which now Mr. Dountas says gives Greece the right to dictate the terms of a settlement in Cyprus.

142. I also wish on this occasion to point out a contradiction in Greece's position. On the one hand, it rejects the Treaty of Guarantee and it says it does not want to become a party to a treaty of guarantee in the future, and, on the other hand, they take advantage of it today. They say that as a guaranteeing Power they have the right to interfere in the negotiating process in Cyprus. We are not doing that.

143. As far as Pericles is concerned, I must say that we all owe a debt to Pericles. But Greece itself has not been very faithful to Pericles, and we would therefore all do very well to be respectful to Pericles, but also to render to Caesar what is due to Caesar—and certainly Greece owes

to the Turkish intervention in Cyprus after the Greek invasion of Cyprus a debt of gratitude for its own democracy.

144. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In spite of my appeal the representative of Greece wishes to make a statement, and I therefore call upon him.

145. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I immensely appreciate the Council's generosity. I would like to say that I did not say I was going to dictate a solution. Again, I repeat that what I said is that we wanted to make our position clear. As to the Treaty of Guarantee, we never said we were not a guaranteeing Power. What we said is that we do not recognize that the Treaty of Guarantee gives the right of military intervention in Cyprus.

146. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Cyprus wishes to make a statement, and I now call upon him.

147. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): If the Treaty of Guarantee had given such a right, it would have been against the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. As we all know, Article 103 does not allow for such contradiction.

148. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus completed the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

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